By Mark Ferullo

Executive Summary

Hundreds of thousands killed, injured, and raped. Millions more displaced. After five years of violence in South Sudan, the peace agreement signed in September 2018 is a hopeful attempt to end the corruption-fueled war.

But this is an uncertain time in South Sudan. The overall commitment to the peace agreement is low and implementation of some key provisions of the agreement has stalled completely. At the same time, President Salva Kiir continues to control South Sudan’s violent kleptocratic system of government that has deliberately constructed an infrastructure for corruption and private gain for its leaders. A peace agreement that is founded on this corrupt system is at high risk of crumbling because the system perpetuates a cyclical, competitive, and at times violent contest for power. In this system, the people of South Sudan suffer.

An Economic Governance Strategy…

To avoid backsliding into war, a deliberate strategy is needed to address South Sudan’s weak economic governance—the institutional structure and regulations that monitor and guide the functioning of a fair, accountable, and transparent economy. Without bold and innovative reforms and swift consequences for systemic corruption, the state’s economic resources will remain the ultimate prize—one that, as years of war have proven, is worth fighting over.

South Sudanese outside the leadership of the violent kleptocracy, such as civil society, youth groups, and opposition leaders, have consistently demanded an end to entrenched corruption. For South Sudanese fed up with the kleptocracy, the peace agreement is an opportunity to position economic governance reforms front and center during the implementation.

International supporters should follow the lead of South Sudanese civil society and chip away at the very foundation of the country’s violent kleptocracy. Narrowing nonemergency donor assistance to support discrete aspects of South Sudan’s economic governance would limit donor exposure and help to reestablish trust in the country’s leaders.

…That Includes Financial Pressures and Incentives…

This pre-transitional period before the three-year unity government forms is a rare opening to improve economic governance—but the leaders of the Kiir-led kleptocracy will not voluntarily dismantle the infrastructure of corruption they have built.

To motivate Kiir and the transitional government to stick to the peace agreement and adopt the recommendations in this report, international donors and partners should rely on financial incentives. The need to finance the peace agreement and boost the post-war economy provides international leverage to champion reforms. In particular, a coordinated international strategy should link financial assistance—which the government has requested—to the implementation of anti-corruption recommendations outlined in this report.

Financial pressures aimed at altering the kleptocracy’s incentive structure should work alongside the financial incentives. Tools of financial pressure, including targeted network sanctions and anti-money laundering enforcement, should be deployed against the government and corporate actors both inside and outside the country who enable and profit from the violent kleptocracy. Until the infrastructure of the system Kiir leads is dismantled, the incentives to crater the rule of law and undermine good economic governance will be too strong.

…Should Begin to Dismantle the Violent Kleptocracy

The Enough Project recommends 10 steps that would incorporate financial safeguards and economic oversight into the peace agreement.[v] These initial recommendations are not comprehensive but rather focus on specific policies that South Sudan and international supporters should jointly enact to lay the groundwork for a more transparent, inclusive, and responsive government.

When combined with financial pressures aimed at altering the leadership’s incentive structure, these recommendations—which are detailed in this report—should begin to dismantle the violent kleptocracy and also support economic governance reforms that can help to prevent a return to war.

1. ​Install Central Bank Technical Advisory Body
   
2. Appoint AU Transparency Envoy
   
3. Start Independent National Audit
   
4. Build e-Transparency Online System
   
5. Set Up South Sudan Forum on Asset Recovery
   
6. Establish International Commission Against Impunity
   
7. Promote Gender Equality and Economic Opportunity for Women
   
8. Elevate Role of the Independent Boundaries Commission
   
9. Complete Corruption and Governance Review
   
10. Broaden South Sudan Reconstruction Board

“The Compendium”, is a collection of short reports on selected outbreaks that occurred in the WHO African Region between 2016 and 2018 and which were successfully controlled.

This edition of the Compendium covers 19 outbreaks, which occurred in 15 countries, presented in chronological order. These include yellow fever in Uganda, cholera in South Sudan, Rift Valley fever in Niger, meningitis in Nigeria, listeriosis in South Africa, malaria in Cabo Verde, Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever in Namibia, cholera in Malawi, Ebola virus disease in Democratic Republic of the Congo (Likati, May 2017), meningococcal septicemia in Liberia, cholera in Nigeria (north-east), pneumonic plague in Madagascar, Marburg fever in Uganda, dengue fever in Senegal, Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever in Mauritania, influenza A H1N1 in Ghana, Lassa fever in Nigeria, Ebola virus disease in Democratic Republic of the Congo (Equateur; May 2018), and Rift Valley fever in Kenya.

The reports are presented in a way that makes them accessible to a wide audience – epidemiologists, policy makers, strategists and anyone working in the area of health emergency responses.

Introduction

Sub-Saharan Africa experiences over 100 acute public health emergencies each year. Most of the events are outbreaks of infectious diseases. However, the region continuously faces ongoing humanitarian crises and frequent natural disasters. All 47 member states are at risk.
WHO is committed to saving lives and reducing suffering during times of crisis – whether caused by conflict, disease outbreak or a disaster. The WHO Health Emergencies Programme is mandated to undertake WHO’s functions and responsibilities during health emergencies. The vision of this programme is to protect health and save lives during outbreaks and emergencies. Our mission is to help countries and to coordinate international actions, to prevent, prepare for, detect, rapidly respond to, and recover from outbreaks and other emergencies.

The priorities of this programme include:

Supporting the assessment of country health emergency preparedness and development of national plans to address critical capacity gaps Developing strategies and capacities to prevent and control high-threat infectious hazards Monitoring of new and ongoing public health events to assess, communicate and recommend actions for public health risks Ensuring readiness to diminish public health risks in countries with high vulnerability Providing life-saving health services to affected populations in countries with ongoing emergencies.

Specific programme areas that fall under this global programme include:

Country Health Emergency Preparedness and the International Health Regulations (CPI)
Emergency Operations (EMO)
Health Emergency Information and Risk Assessments (HIM)
Infectious Hazards Management (IHM)
Management and Administration (MGA).

In March 2017, the WHO Health Emergencies Programme in the Regional Office for Africa started the Weekly Bulletin on Outbreaks and Other Emergencies, which is a summary of new and ongoing events, put together using reports from country offices. This is sent out to about 2 500 recipients each week and has been extremely well received.

The Compendium of Short Reports on Selected Outbreaks in the African Region, “The Compendium”, complements the Weekly Bulletin and aims to document outbreaks that have ocurred in the WHO African Region, responded to and successfully controlled by the respective Member States, WHO Health Emergencies Programme and other stakeholders. The Compendium illustrates how short reports can contribute to sharing information and approaches to different public health events, emergencies and outbreaks.

Each report has a similar structure, with a summary of the event, which highlights key features, the evolution of the event with a brief epidemiological description, public health actions, any gaps in action and a discussion of the situation.

The reports are presented in a way that makes them accessible to a wide audience – epidemiologists, policy makers, strategists and anyone working in the area of emergency responses.

In the context of assisting in the transition and recovery of conflict affected societies and communities, IOM has supported disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programmes for ex-combatants/fighters and their communities of return, through more than 120 projects over the last 25 years. Primarily comprised of reintegration-related work, these projects have been spread across more than 30 countries, with particularly extensive work in Colombia and sub-Saharan Africa.

IOM's involvement in DDR derives from the Organization's commitment to the prevention and resolution of conflict as a principle driver of crisis induced displacement. DDR programming not only addresses the causes and consequences of conflict, as critical instigators of displacement, but helps create conditions for the progressive resolution of displacement situations and the prevention of future displacement.

This Compendium presents a selection of IOM's DDR portfolio between 2010 and 2017, embedded within a broader, theoretical framework. The document is structured in two parts. The first part outlines the theoretical context and the second presents IOM's DDR and DDR-related programmes between 2010 and 2017. These projects reflect the evolution of DDR, presented in three distinct 'generations' of work, which accordingly map to different contexts, project approaches and beneficiaries.

OVERVIEW

• 12 Access incidents

• 329,000 Vulnerable people affected

• 113,000 Vulnerable children affected

FORECAST

The trajectory of implementing the R-ARCSS over the coming months will have a large impact on humanitarian access, especially to and for women and children. If security continues to improve with the relatively successful implementation of the peace agreement, there is likely to be a further increase in refugee returnees. If not managed and supported effectively, this could lead to inter-communal or inter-ethnic tensions that could hinder access to assist with their resettlement.

On the other hand, continued delays or the failure to implement key provisions of the agreement will likely lead to the continuation and or renewed hostilities in several parts of the country, which would have a disproportionate impact on women and children, who are already the most vulnerable and with limited resilience to further violence. The ongoing fighting in parts of Central and Western Equatoria is likely to continue, limiting access for both UNICEF’s regular programmes and Ebola preparedness activities. Local disagreements over peace implementation are beginning to emerge, particularly in Western Equatoria, Western Bahr el Ghazal and Unity, which could also lead to the renewal of conflict and limited access. The increase in restrictions of movement from government to SPLA-IO areas this month could indicate a trend in this direction.

Cattle raiding in Jongeli, Unity and Warrap also continue to negatively impact on access to vulnerable populations.

Clean water can save lives in emergency contexts and it is essential for sustaining recovery after crises. Access to safe drinking water is a human right and is the primary driver of the International Organization for Migration’s water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) interventions — it also enables the other components of effective WASH responses. IOM-WASH programmes are designed to reach the most in need, especially crisis-affected populations in hard-to-reach locations, aiming to leave no one behind as expressed in the theme for World Water Day 2019 (22 March).

IOM provides safe drinking water around the world through infrastructure interventions; by providing items and products for water storage and treatment at household or community level; or through the facilitation of water access through vouchers or water trucking according to the needs in the different contexts of operation. IOM aims to ensure unrestricted and equitable access to safe and affordable water for those in need, complementing safe water provision with information about appropriate sanitation practices and the methodical promotion of good hygiene.

In SouthSudan, IOM provides safe water through surface water treatment systems and borehole water supply systems for over 150,000 IDPs that have sought refuge in the Protection of Civilians (PoC) sites within the UN peace keeping missions. In 2018 IOM built the largest solar-powered water supply system for the Rohingya’s in camps in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh— providing 500 m³ of water per day, reaching 30,000 beneficiaries and ensuring the minimum of 15 litres per person per day required in an emergency.

In Ethiopia, IDPs are enabled to access safe water through the distribution of water containers and water purification tablets.

Protection of the environment and the sustainable use of the water resource is considered a key element of IOM’s WASH interventions. IOM South Sudan started a comprehensive groundwater monitoring programme in 2016 which included data acquisition from production wells at the PoC site. The evaluation aimed to collect information on the seasonal impact on water levels in the site’s aquifers and to prevent misuse of the natural resource. In Bangladesh, IOM works to provide enough safe water at the Rohingya camps in Cox’s Bazar, to support the almost 1,000,000 refugees settled there, by gathering data to ensure sustainable groundwater management and ensure that the aquifers are never depleted.

Along with the provision of safe water and its related infrastructures, IOM interventions include preventing discriminatory practices and beliefs which could reinforce existing gender inequalities and prevent women and girls’ access to water and sanitation facilities. For IOM, it is fundamental that women are included and allowed to take the lead as members of Water Management Committees, but they are also involved in the construction, rehabilitation and maintenance of the water points. Universal and equitable access to safe and affordable drinking water is one of the main objectives of IOM WASH interventions; the organization is committed to guaranteeing inclusion and fighting inequalities that principally affect women, girls, disabled people, refugees, and internally displaced people who are more often the poorest and the most marginalized when it comes to their basic human right to water. They should never be left behind.

SITUATION OVERVIEW

In February, several response missions took place to areas including Ezo, James Diko, Mabia, Nagero, Namutina, Source Yubu and Yangri, all in Yambio County, Western Equatoria; Lanyia, Mororo and Lasu, Yei area, Central Equatoria; Pageri, Lobonok and Terekeka counties, also in Central Equatoria; and Koch, Leer and Mayendit, Unity. A reactive measles vaccination campaign was conducted in the Bor Protection of Civilians site. A total of 526 children aged between 6 and 59 months were vaccinated. As of 2 March, a total of 944 healthcare care workers and frontline aid workers from Yei and Yambio had received the vaccine against the Ebola Virus Disease.

At the end of January, aid organizations had delivered assistance and protection to 1.5 million people since the beginning of the year; representing 26 per cent of the 5.7 million targeted for assistance in 2019. The assistance provided includes nearly 1.3 million people reached by food assistance and emergency livelihoods support; over 380,000 people provided with access to improved water sources; more than 21,000 people assisted with vital non-food items and emergency shelter, including blankets and mosquito nets; nearly 84,000 children and pregnant women and new mothers provided with emergency nutritional assistance; over 73,000 children provided with access to education in emergencies; nearly 180,000 people reached through health consultations; and some 44,000 people who received services related to gender-based violence, child protection, mine awareness education and general protection.

FOOD SECURITY AND AGRICULTURE

One third of the population has no food stocks and will not make it through the lean season

Most households have harvested their crops and are threshing sorghum. According to FSMU latest quarterly report, ‘severe food insecurity has declined between October 2018 and January 2019, remaining at record lows in the monitored areas. The total population experiencing severe food insecurity fell to 1 percent, or 11,268 people, compared to 4 percent both last quarter and this time last year. Moderate food insecurity fell to 36 percent in January 2019 from 52 percent both last quarter and last year.’

According to FSMU, overall, food production, as of January 2019, improved compared with previous years, as stronger late rains and better far farms access increased farm production. Levels of production however are still lower than normal, due to the loss of arable land in Heiban and Umdorein because of the conflict in 2015, but the population has managed to organize effectively in the SPLMN controlled areas of South Kordofan.

However, while this year’s main harvest was better than last year’s, according to FSMU, it did not provide enough for households to last through the lean season. CU monitors reported a growing number of the population already without food stocks in February, and those will to make it through the lean season. As reported by FSMU, ‘in most of the monitored areas […] 34 percent of households held no stocks at all, below the 39 percent of last year and even farther below the 48 percent documented in January 2017.’ In Western Jebels, the share of households entirely lacking food stocks increased from 38 percent in January 2018 to 46 percent in January 2019.’ The situation is especially critical in Dilling and Lagawa. ‘Nearly 50 percent of Lagawa households reported no food stocks in January 2019 compared to 26 percent in January 2018’, noted FSMU.

Food insecurity pockets have been reported by key informants in February in Western Kadugli and Thobo A and B (Al Buram). That is also due to an influx of returnees from both Khartoum and the refugee camps in South Sudan. Reports show that food shortages and insecurity are pushing Nuba people back to the SPLM/A controlled areas. Recent tracking organized by local NGOs has indicated that 112 people returned in late 2018, and 24 in 2019, most of the returnees still go unreported.

While according to FSMU, households reached record low severe food insecurity in January 2019, the moderately food insecure population continued to grow in Southern Kurmuk County of Blue Nile. Alarming levels of food insecurity were reported by CU monitors in February, especially in areas where erratic rains affected food production. Some areas with large and productive farms, such as Benamo in Yabus payam, have reportedly produced very poorly (20-30%). Production in Komo Ganza was affected by early flooding.

As a result, according to the Secretary of Agriculture, for 50-70% of the population in Blue Nile, food stocks will have ended during February 2019. In parts of Koma Ganza and Wadaka, food storages were already depleted by the end of that month and 75% of the communities were already depending on markets to meet their food needs. A recent assessment in the North-West part of Kurmuk revealed that people are mostly depending on roots and wild fruits. Food insecurity levels are expected to grow in the coming months. Eight households were reported to have moved from Chali payam to Moguf due to food shortages.

Investments in restructuring existing river garden sites in Chali and Wadaga, in irrigation projects and in agriculture training should be enhanced in Blue Nile to reduce the effect of erratic rains and chronic food insecurity.

Local food prices remain well above last year’s levels, threatening food access during the coming lean season. At the same time, livestock prices are going down, for example in Western Jebels, affecting coping mechanisms of the population. Because of limited supplies, and the overall crisis in the country, prices are expected to rise. In February, most people could not afford buying commodities in the market. Sorghum prices in Dalami and Um Durain in February were up to 300 South Sudanese Pound (SSP) for a malwa. The sorghum price in Western Kadugli was 35 SDG, three times higher than in the rest of the locality under Sudan’s Government control (as per Fewsnet February 2019), at up to 65 SDG in Western Jebels.

In Blue Nile, according to CU monthly market survey, market functionality was partial in Balila and Mayak with fewer traders and customers than January. This is due to declining of purchasing power from local communities. Road status to Mayak is also an issue. No maize was available in the markets. Generally, market prices in the two markets fluctuate greatly depending on many external factors. On the other hand, Yabus and Moguf markets are fully operational with most commodities available and prices are more stable. Price of sorghum was at 400 SSP/malwa (100 higher than in South Kordofan). According to the Secretary of Agriculture, only 25-50% of the population can afford buying food from market.

Recent assessments in February were conducted in western Blue Nile and North West Kurmuk. People mostly rely on wild fruits and leaves to survive and the two markets, Hemura and Zosok, are functioning though very poorly and only for few hours a week due to insecurity

MOSES YAKUDU

Within the tall walls of state Prison fence, hundreds have lived without stepping at the gate step to see what goes around Torit town, Juveniles unbelievably inside the fence felt freed to jump and sing for the joy of the day in their prison life.

“Today in Torit State prison, I feel freed because I can play, shout and clap for winning the games while in this place”, say Louis Ongwai

Hopes of good lives after sentence was conveyed through messages of peace, advice, education and assorted games that include tug of Peace and musical chair competitions among the activities to reform and put the long-awaited smiles to the faces of the minors again.

The wins of the games by the juveniles over the peace ambassadors were as a result of cohesion of the hundreds of male and female inmates who consistently sing to boost morale of the games.

“I thought we prisoners are ignored for the crimes we have committed against our people and government , but I want to apologize to the human rights activists and public for their concerns, I promise to go back to school when I finish serving our sentence”, said Louis Ongwai , a 17 years old juvenile who won musical chair race against youth peace ambassadors.

Crimes, ranging from theft, rape to murder are the main causes of imprisonment to young girls and boys of 12 years and above. Being sentenced for many months and years in Torit State Prison, juveniles regained courage and vowed never to indulge in what will make them end up behind bars and stinky cells again.

“I’m now two years old here , I killed a girl in a fight, I regret doing that today and now I’m where I only take bath once a day”, said the 28 years old Paska Dominic while she wipes tears using the sleeve of the blue blouse of her prison uniform in regret of murdering her fellow woman two year ago. “I have missed this kind of freedom and friends.”

“We end up being in jail because we ignore education through multiple platforms, and today I challenge you to learn and to have hope because it’s not late.”, said Martin Saha, the deputy chairperson of youth Peace Ambassadors while ending his messages of advice to the juveniles.

Youth Peace Ambassadors in Torit are the role model of boys and girls, agents of peace and reconciliation within the society and schools, they sensitize different communities in Torit through messages, drama, poem and comedy. They had a written piece to read out to the juveniles at the prison.

This UNMISS organized event was designed to reform juveniles through a strengthened education system, it’s in line with the already existing ‘Accelerated Learning Program’ that enhances learning conditions of inmates who are at the school-going age and are serving sentences in the prisons. The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) is working with all South Sudanese national stakeholders in Justice sector to ensure peace and justice prevails in the country considering the revitalized peace agreement.

“Our mandate is to deter conflict through peace as well as reduce crimes in South Sudan. Once peace is strengthened conflict will reduce and crimes will also reduce automatically.”, said Anthony Nwapa, the UNMISS Human Rights while representing UNMISS Head of Field Office during the event.

The activity was a big relief to the prison authority, as managing the inmates of such a big capacity in the small prison is stressful. The prison Act 2011 says the juvenile prisoners are subject to compulsory education where available, event outside the prison institution. Other access to activities like social services, religious care, recreational activities and contacts with their families are to boost their welfare in the prison, however, the facility available is opposed to the services written in the prison act.

“I plead to UNMISS to continue supporting such useful programs at least after every three months because it helps in reforming the juveniles and making work easier to the prison officers.”, Says Margaret Idwa, the acting State minister of local government. “To the juveniles, I urge you to benefit from the services time here to improve, you have to leave the prison when you a different person.”

• Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) 2019: USD 1.65 billion, targeting 9 million most vulnerable people

• 12.8 million people under food insecurity

• 2.8 million new IDPs (Internally Displaced People) since 2018

• Over 550 000 refugees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

• Human Development Indicators (HDI): DRC 176 out of 189 countries

OKELLO JAMES

It is not every day that a bicycle is viewed as an important tool for building peace, but in some remote and hard-to-reach areas of South Sudan, like Lopa, Ikotos, Torit East, Kidepo Valley, Chukudum, Kimotong and Riwoto Counties in the country’s Eastern Equatoria region, any item that eases transport is very welcome.

Peacemakers in the region will now have their peace-making journeys made lighter, thanks to the support of peace partners in the region, who have donated to them some 40 brand-new bicycles and an assortment of other goodies, including mobile phones, rain coats, and gumboots.

“This is going to help me very much because it takes me four to five hours to walk from my place to the Headquarters, so it will help me in facilitating giving reports,” said Tito Abas Lomoro, one of the recipients of a brand-new bicycle. “I also have to go to other payams like Okokore, since they are not represented. I will be moving to disseminate this peace program,” said the determined peacemaker.

The donation was unveiled at the end of a ten-day training programme that focused on transformational leadership and peace-building skills for members of the border migratory peace committees from the Torit and Kapoeta areas, organized by the area Peace Commission, with support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Viable Support to Transition and Stability (VISTAS) and the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).

“The bicycle will help us to go and resolve conflict in the villages,” said Paska Aku Alfred, adding, “when there is misunderstanding in another payam, we will hurry there to settle it. It was difficult for us to move to other places, now it is good we are going to work together,” she concluded.

This is the second donation coming after almost four months since the UNDP donated the first batch of bicycles to the peace committees to facilitates their movements to resolve conflict in the communities.

“In fact, before this, it was very difficult for us to move from the county headquarters to other payams because of lack of means of transport. Now that we have the bicycles [and phones] it will be very easy for us to communicate and to go to the county and payams,” said William Oniama, a participant and bicycle recipient from Lopa County in Torit.

Already, positive results are being recorded, thanks to the first donation. According to Tito Abas Lomoro, who is also the Executive Director of Kimotong County in Kapoeta, there has been a reduction in inter-communal conflict and cattle-related incidents in some places, following improved coordination among peace committees.

“The rate of theft and cattle raiding has reduced, and we have also formed some committees in the kraals,” said Mr. Lomoro. “Now, this training we have done here in Torit is a benefit that we are going to take back to our people on the ground. What we got is very helpful, especially now they have given [us] material support like the bicycles, which will ease facilitation of peace members.”

Charles Alphonse, Acting Chairperson of Torit State Peace Commission, reminded the peace committees to use the bicycles for the rightful purpose.

“I want to inform you that these bicycles are not for personal use, they for official purposes, did you hear that?” he asked, before adding, “the mobile phones are, too. If there are issues, you need to communicate together so that you give us full information. You can report to the county commission, to the peace commissioner and to the UNDP,” he said.

UNDP Conflict Training Officer, Margaret Lado explained why the agency decided to focus on bicycles:

“In these counties there’re no transport facilities; these bicycles will help them to move from village to village to do peace work because they are tasked to be peace ambassadors,” she said. “They are tasked to solve conflict in a nonviolent manner,” concluded Ms. Lado.

In all, the peacebuilders were given 42 bicycles, 14 mobiles phones, 42 raincoats and 42 gumboots, which has brought them big relief as they seek to embark on conflict resolution at the grass-roots level to foster peaceful coexistence among the communities.

Introduction

The Yambio food security and livelihoods (FSL) brief was conducted as part of GIZ’s (The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH) Food Security and Agricultural Development programme (2017-2019) and funded by BMZ (German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development). The programme’s main objective is to improve food security for populations affected by conflict and malnutrition. The overall aim is to improve the productivity of farms and reduce reliance on food aid. In the long term, surplus production can be used to supply markets, increasing resilience and income generating activities.

As a result of an increase in insecurity during the 2018 planting season, understanding food security in Yambio County has been a concern. According to OCHA data, approximately 18,500 internally displaced persons (IDPs) were in Yambio county due to insecurity in the first half of 2018, resulting in higher vulnerability to shocks, including unexpected reduction of local resources and high market prices, as many have less assets and resources to access food. Additionally, the influx of IDP likely placed added pressure on local resources.

To better understand the level of livelihood disruption and food insecurity related to the insecurity, the brief analyses information from REACH Area of Knowledge (AoK), focus group discussions (FGDs), and preliminary food security and nutrition monitoring system (FSNMS) data from the World Food Programme (WFP). In December 2018, FSNMS teams collected a total of 104 randomly sampled household (HH) surveys from nine enumeration clusters. In addition, AoK data for Western Equatoria state in January 2019, consisted of 125 key informant (KI) interviews from 122 unique settlements. To better contextualize the data, two FGDs were conducted along with direct observation from REACH field teams.

Key Findings

• The combination of insecurity during the 2018 planting season, March through April, and short dry spells throughout the growing season, May through August, likely led to a below average harvest and decreased HHs’ ability to rely on their own food stocks between harvest periods.

• According to preliminary FSNMS data, the combination of high market reliance and market price volatility has resulted in HHs in Yambio county being exposed to unpredictable market shocks. More than half, 52%, of HHs stated that markets are the main source of cereals after food stocks are depleted. Additionally, 34% of HHs reported unusually high food prices, suggesting that the combination of a below average harvest, supply chain disruptions and an earlier than normal increase in demand is already affecting market prices.

• According to FSNMS data, nearly half of the HHs in Yambio have poor food consumption scores (FCS) and low household diet diversity scores (HDDS), suggesting an overall poor diet diversity. However, 40% of HHs reported experiencing little hunger according to the household hunger score (HHS) and 84% engaged in stress food consumption coping, as per the reduced coping strategy index (rCSI), reinforcing the notion that HHs have sufficient a quantity of food.

• Findings indicate that insecurity disrupted livelihoods and had a negative impact on HH agricultural productivity which has had a spillover effect on HH food consumption. Direct food outcome indicators suggest that HHs have relatively poor food quality, however are consuming a sufficient quantity of food. Market dependency is expected to increase in the coming months as HHs deplete remaining food stocks and switch to markets as their primary source of cereals, however, price volatility is expected to decrease financial access to food.

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2409 (2018), by which the Council requested me to report on the implementation of the commitments under the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region. It provides an overview of peace and security developments in the Great Lakes region since the issuance of my previous report (S/2018/886) and covers the period from 1 September 2018 to 28 February 2019.

II. Major developments

A. Security situation

2. The activities of foreign and domestic illegal armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, cross-border security incidents, insecurity in the Central African Republic, sporadic fighting between Government and opposition forces in South Sudan and clashes between the Burundian armed forces and armed groups had a negative impact on peace and stability in the Great Lakes region during the reporting period.

3. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, tensions were reported before and after the elections of 30 December 2018 and included instances of protests, violence, clashes between supporters of opposing parties and heavy-handed dispersion of demonstrators by security forces. On a positive note, armed groups that had been very vocal about the outcome of the elections appear to have adopted a “wait and see” approach since the proclamation of the final results of the presidential election. In the Kasai region, an uptrend in the number of Kamuina Nsapu militia members laying down their weapons was recorded during the same period. In Mai-Ndombe Province, the security situation in Yumbi territory remains of concern, after violence broke out between the Batende and Banunu ethnic groups, which a human rights investigation confirmed had resulted in 535 deaths.

4. In the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, suspected members of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) stepped up attacks in the Beni area, targeting civilians, the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). At least 245 civilians, including 55 women and seven children, were killed in attacks attributed to ADF in 2018. The group reportedly continued to recruit followers from countries in the Great Lakes region and beyond. On 12 November, FARDC and MONUSCO launched a joint military operation against the group to prevent a potential attack on Beni town and to protect civilians. A total of 13 FARDC soldiers and seven United Nations peacekeepers were killed during the operation. On 20 November, the military spokesperson of Uganda announced the deployment of approximately 4,000 troops along the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo to prevent infiltration and attacks by ADF. In Ituri Province, as dialogue on demobilization and disarmament continued between the Government and the rebel Force de résistance patriotique en Ituri, the parties met on 20 January, discussed pre-cantonment and financial issues and agreed on a security assessment of pre-cantonment sites, as well as meetings with provincial authorities. Meanwhile, subgroups of the Lord’s Resistance Army have become more active in Haut-Uélé Province, and the latter half of January saw an increase in the number of incidents attributed to this armed group.

5. On 15 December, FARDC arrested the spokesperson and deputy head of intelligence of the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), and media sources reported their extradition to Rwanda in January. While the extradition and repatriation of disarmed FDLR combatants weakened the group, FDLR remained active. On 16 and 17 December, seven FARDC soldiers were reportedly killed in two separate attacks by suspected FDLR rebels. Military operations in December and January against an FDLR splinter group, Conseil national pour le renouveau et la démocratie-Ubwiyunge, forced the latter to abandon positions in North Kivu and move into South Kivu.

6. In Burundi, the security situation remained relatively calm yet unpredictable and was marked by isolated security incidents. On 4 September, unidentified armed individuals attacked Nkurubuye colline in Ruyigi Province, along the border between Burundi and the United Republic of Tanzania. On 19 October, suspected elements of the Burundian armed group Résistance pour un état de droit au Burundi-Tabara (RED-Tabara) attacked an army position in Bubanza Province. Burundian armed forces captured two assailants, while the others reportedly fled into the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

7. The security situation in the Central African Republic remained fragile. On 15 November, the Union pour la paix en Centrafrique, an armed group affiliated with the ex-Séléka, together with armed civilians, attacked the camp for displaced persons in Alindao. Between 70 and 100 civilians among the estimated 18,000 civilians hosted in the camp were killed. In addition, some armed groups continued to acquire weapons and ammunition from neighbouring countries, as reported by the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic in its report S/2018/1119.

8. In South Sudan, sporadic fighting between the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces and opposition forces, as well as among opposition groups, continued. Incidents of intercommunal and intracommunal violence were also reported, resulting in civilian casualties and displacement.

9. Cross-border security incidents were reported in the areas between Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, contributing to enhanced tensions between Burundi and Rwanda. On 15 September, suspected elements of the Forces nationales de libération (FNL) reportedly entered Burundi from South Kivu to attack a border post at Gatumba. On 19 September, a local leader of the Imbonerakure, the ruling party’s youth wing, was killed with his wife, near the border with Rwanda. The Ministry of Public Security of Burundi attributed the attack to an armed group from Rwanda. On 7 October, unidentified armed elements reportedly from Rwanda killed three civilians in Cibitoke Province in Burundi. Also, in October, FARDC reportedly clashed with FNL in South Kivu. Furthermore, the Burundian national defence force was reported to have entered South Kivu between November and January, in pursuit of Burundian armed elements. Deadly clashes were also reported between the Burundian national defence force, supported by Imbonerakure, and RED-Tabara, as well as FNL.

10. Armed groups also staged attacks targeting Rwanda. On 10 December, the FDLR-Forces combattantes abacunguzi made a cross-border incursion into Busesamana village, in Rubavu district in Rwanda, and killed at least three soldiers, according to the Government of Rwanda. On 15 December, unidentified armed attackers, reportedly coming from Burundi, launched an attack in Kitabi Sector, southern Rwanda, setting fire to three passenger vehicles and killing two civilians. According to Rwanda’s military spokesperson, three of the attackers were killed, while the rest fled to Burundi.

11. The Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo reported the presence of an armed coalition known as “P5” associated with Rwandan opposition groups, which was active in South Kivu and reportedly received arms and ammunition from Burundi.

12. In September, the follow-up mechanism for the repatriation of former combatants, launched on 24 April 2018, facilitated the repatriation of 11 disarmed FDLR combatants to Rwanda from the Walungu transit camp, in South Kivu. In November, another 52 disarmed FDLR combatants and dependants volunteered for repatriation. This brought the total number of disarmed FDLR combatants repatriated through the follow-up mechanism since April 2018 to 98.

13. Between 20 and 27 November, Congolese authorities, through bilateral arrangements with the Government of Rwanda, repatriated 1,392 disarmed FDLR combatants and dependants, following the closure of transit camps in Kanyobagonga, Kisangani and Walungu, in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Furthermore, 242 FDLR elements previously detained in the Angenga prison, in Equateur Province, were handed over to Rwanda. All disarmed combatants were transferred to the Mutobo Demobilization and Reintegration Camp in Rwanda.

14. In another positive development, in October, cooperation between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and MONUSCO resulted in the relocation out of MONUSCO premises of the remaining 51 members of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition, who had been in the care of MONUSCO since August 2016.

I. Introduction

1. Établi en application de la résolution 2409 (2018) du Conseil de sécurité, par laquelle le Conseil m’a prié de lui présenter un rapport sur le respect des engagements pris dans l’Accord-cadre pour la paix, la sécurité et la coopération pour la République démocratique du Congo et la région, le présent rapport donne un aperçu de l’évolution de la situation en matière de paix et de sécurité dans la région des Grands Lacs depuis la publication de mon précédent rapport (S/2018/886) et couvre la période allant du 1er septembre 2018 au 28 février 2019.

II. Principaux faits nouveaux

A. Conditions de sécurité

2. Pendant la période considérée, la paix et la stabilité dans la région des Grands Lacs ont été mises à mal par les activités des groupes armés illégaux étrangers et nationaux en République démocratique du Congo, les atteintes à la sécurité en zone transfrontalière, l’insécurité en République centrafricaine, les combats sporadiques entre les forces gouvernementales et les forces d’opposition au Soudan du Sud et les affrontements entre les forces armées burundaises et les groupes armés.

3. En République démocratique du Congo, des tensions ont été signalées avant et après les élections du 30 décembre 2018, notamment des manifestations, des violences, des affrontements entre partisans de partis opposés ainsi que la dispersion brutale de manifestants par les forces de sécurité. Sur une note plus positive, les groupes armés dont les prises de position avaient été les plus virulentes ont semble-t-il adopté une approche attentiste depuis la proclamation des résultats définitifs de l’élection présidentielle. Dans la région du Kasaï, on a enregistré pendant la même période une augmentation du nombre de membres de la milice Kamuina Nsapu qui déposent les armes. Dans la province du Maï-Ndombe, les conditions de sécurité dans le territoire de Yumbi demeurent préoccupantes, après l’éclatement de violences entre les groupes ethniques Batende et Banunu, qui, comme l’a confirmé une enquête sur les droits de l’homme, ont fait 535 morts.

4. Dans l’est de la République démocratique du Congo, des membres présumés des Forces démocratiques alliées (ADF) ont intensifié leurs attaques dans la région de Beni, ciblant des civils, les Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC) et la Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo (MONUSCO). Au moins 245 civils, dont 55 femmes et 7 enfants, ont été tués dans des attaques attribuées aux ADF en 2018. Le groupe aurait continué à recruter dans les pays de la région des Grands Lacs et au-delà. Le 12 novembre, pour prévenir une attaque potentielle contre la ville de Beni et protéger les civils, les FARDC et la MONUSCO ont lancé une opération militaire conjointe contre les ADF au cours de laquelle 13 soldats des FARDC et sept soldats de la paix des Nations Unies ont été tués. Le 20 novembre, le porte-parole militaire de l’Ouganda a annoncé le déploiement d’environ 4 000 soldats le long de la frontière avec la République démocratique du Congo pour empêcher les infiltrations et les attaques des ADF. Dans la province de l’Ituri, alors que le dialogue sur la démobilisation et le désarmement se poursuivait entre le Gouvernement et le groupe rebelle Force de résistance patriotique de l’Ituri, les parties se sont rencontrées le 20 janvier, ont examiné les questions relatives au précantonnement et aux aspects financiers et ont convenu de procéder à une évaluation de la sécurité des sites de précantonnement et de tenir des réunions avec les autorités provinciales. Dans le même temps, des sous-groupes de l’Armée de résistance du Seigneur sont devenus plus actifs dans la province du Haut-Uélé, et on a observé une recrudescence des incidents attribués à ce groupe armé au cours de la seconde moitié du mois de janvier.

5. Le 15 décembre, les FARDC ont arrêté le porte-parole et le responsable adjoint du renseignement des Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), lesquels, selon les médias, ont été extradés vers le Rwanda en janvier. Bien qu’affaiblies par l’extradition et le rapatriement de combattants désarmés, les FDLR sont demeurées actives. Les 16 et 17 décembre, sept soldats des FARDC auraient été tués dans deux attaques distinctes par des individus présumés être des rebelles des FDLR. Les opérations militaires menées en décembre et en janvier contre un groupe dissident des FDLR, le Conseil national pour le renouveau et la démocratie-Ubwiyunge, ont forcé ce dernier à abandonner ses positions du Nord-Kivu et à s’installer dans le Sud-Kivu.

6. Au Burundi, la situation en matière de sécurité a été caractérisée par le maintien d’un calme relatif en dépit d’une certaine imprévisibilité et d’incidents isolés. Le 4 septembre, des individus armés non identifiés ont lancé une attaque dans la zone de la colline de Nkurubuye, dans la province de Ruyigi, le long de la frontière entre le Burundi et la République-Unie de Tanzanie. Le 19 octobre, des éléments présumés appartenir au groupe armé burundais Résistance pour un état de droit au Burundi (RED Tabara) ont attaqué une position de l’armée dans la province de Bubanza. Les forces armées burundaises ont capturé deux des assaillants, tandis que les autres se seraient enfuis en République démocratique du Congo.

7. En République centrafricaine, les conditions de sécurité demeurent précaires. Le 15 novembre, l’Union pour la paix en Centrafrique, un groupe armé affilié à l’ex-Séléka, ainsi que des civils armés, ont attaqué le camp de personnes déplacées d’Alindao. Entre 70 et 100 des quelque 18 000 civils hébergés dans le camp ont été tués. En outre, certains groupes armés ont continué d’acquérir des armes et des munitions auprès de pays voisins, comme l’a indiqué le Groupe d’experts sur la République centrafricaine dans son rapport paru sous la cote S/2018/1119.

8. Au Soudan du Sud, les combats sporadiques entre les Forces sud-soudanaises de défense du peuple et les forces d’opposition, ainsi qu’entre les groupes d’opposition, ont continué. Des violences entre différentes communautés et au sein d’une même communauté, qui ont fait des victimes parmi les civils et entraîné des déplacements, ont également été signalées.

9. Des atteintes à la sécurité transfrontalières ont été signalées dans les zones situées entre le Burundi, la République démocratique du Congo et le Rwanda, ce qui a contribué à accroître les tensions entre le Burundi et le Rwanda. Le 15 septembre, des éléments présumés appartenir aux Forces nationales de libération (FNL) seraient entrés au Burundi depuis le Sud-Kivu pour attaquer un poste frontière à Gatumba. Le 19 septembre, un dirigeant local de l’aile jeunesse du parti au pouvoir, Imbonerakure, a été tué avec son épouse près de la frontière avec le Rwanda, au cours d’une attaque que le ministère de la Sécurité publique du Burundi a attribué à un groupe armé rwandais. Le 7 octobre, des éléments armés non identifiés provenant apparemment du Rwanda ont tué trois civils dans la province de Cibitoke au Burundi. En octobre également, il y aurait eu des affrontements entre les FARDC et le FNL au Sud-Kivu. En outre, la Force de défense nationale du Burundi serait entrée au Sud-Kivu entre novembre et janvier, à la poursuite d’éléments armés burundais. Des affrontements meurtriers ont également été signalés entre la Force de défense nationale du Burundi, soutenue par Imbonerakure, et RED Tabara, ainsi que les FNL.

10. Des groupes armés ont également organisé des attaques visant le Rwanda. Le 10 décembre, les Forces combattantes abacunguzi ont effectué une incursion transfrontalière dans le village de Busesamana, dans le district de Rubavu au Rwanda, et tué au moins trois soldats, selon le Gouvernement rwandais. Le 15 décembre, des attaquants armés non identifiés, qui proviendraient du Burundi, ont lancé une attaque dans le secteur de Kitabi, dans le sud du Rwanda, mettant le feu à trois véhicules de transport de passagers et tuant deux civils. Selon le porte-parole militaire du Rwanda, trois des attaquants ont été tués et les autres ont fui au Burundi.

11. Le Groupe d’experts sur la République démocratique du Congo a signalé la présence d’une coalition armée connue sous le nom de « P5 », associée à des groupes d’opposition rwandais et active au Sud-Kivu, et qui aurait reçu des armes et munitions en provenance du Burundi.

12. En septembre, le mécanisme de suivi pour le rapatriement des combattants désarmés, qui a commencé ses activités le 24 avril 2018, a facilité le rapatriement vers le Rwanda de 11 combattants désarmés des FDLR depuis le camp de transit de Walungu dans le Sud-Kivu. En novembre, 52 autres combattants désarmés des FDLR, ainsi que les personnes à leur charge, se sont portés volontaires pour être rapatriés, ce qui a porté le nombre total de combattants désarmés des FDLR rapatriés dans le cadre du mécanisme de suivi depuis avril 2018 à 98.

13. Entre le 20 et le 27 novembre, les autorités congolaises, dans le cadre d’arrangements bilatéraux avec le Gouvernement rwandais, ont rapatrié 1 392 combattants désarmés des FDLR ainsi que les personnes à leur charge, après la fermeture des camps de transit de Kanyobagonga, Kisangani et Walungu, dans l’est de la République démocratique du Congo. En outre, 242 éléments des FDLR précédemment détenus dans la prison d’Angenga, dans la province de l’Équateur, ont été remis au Rwanda. Tous les combattants désarmés ont été transférés au camp de démobilisation et de réintégration de Mutobo au Rwanda.

14. Autre évolution positive, en octobre, la coopération entre le Gouvernement de la République démocratique du Congo et la MONUSCO a abouti au transfert hors des locaux de la MONUSCO des 51 membres restants du Mouvement/Armée populaire de libération du Soudan dans l’opposition, qui étaient sous la garde de la Mission depuis août 2016.

Children living in protracted conflicts are three times more likely to die from water-related diseases than from violence – UNICEF

NEW YORK, 22 March 2019 – Children under the age of 15 living in countries affected by protracted conflict are, on average, almost three times more likely to die from diarrhoeal diseases caused by a lack of safe water, sanitation and hygiene than by direct violence, UNICEF said in a new report today.

Water Under Fire looks at mortality rates in 16 countries going through prolonged conflicts and finds that, in most of them, children under the age of five are more than 20 times more likely to die from diarrheal-related deaths linked to lack of access to safe water and sanitation than direct violence.

“The odds are already stacked against children living through prolonged conflicts – with many unable to reach a safe water source,” said UNICEF Executive Director Henrietta Fore. “The reality is that there are more children who die from lack of access to safe water than by bullets."

Without safe and effective water, sanitation and hygiene services, children are at risk of malnutrition and preventable diseases including diarrhoea, typhoid, cholera and polio. Girls are particularly affected: They are vulnerable to sexual violence as they collect water or venture out to use latrines. They deal with affronts to their dignity as they bathe and manage menstrual hygiene. And they miss classes during menstruation if their schools have no suitable water and sanitation facilities.

These threats are exacerbated during conflict when deliberate and indiscriminate attacks destroy infrastructure, injure personnel and cut off the power that keeps water, sanitation and hygiene systems running. Armed conflict also limits access to essential repair equipment and consumables such as fuel or chlorine – which can be depleted, rationed, diverted or blocked from delivery. Far too often, essential services are deliberately denied.

“Deliberate attacks on water and sanitation are attacks on vulnerable children,” said Fore. “Water is a basic right. It is a necessity for life.”

UNICEF works in conflict countries to provide safe drinking water and adequate sanitation services through improving and repairing water systems, trucking water, setting up latrines and promoting awareness of hygiene practices.

UNICEF is calling on governments and partners to:

• Stop attacks on water and sanitation infrastructure and personnel;

• Link life-saving humanitarian responses to the development of sustainable water and sanitation systems for all;

• Reinforce governments and aid agencies’ capacity to consistently provide high-quality water and sanitation services in emergencies.

Notes to Editors:

The report calculated mortality rates in 16 countries with protracted conflict: Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen. In all these countries, with the exception of Libya, Iraq and Syria, children 15 and younger are more likely to die from water-related diseases than as a result of collective violence. Excluding Syria and Libya, children under the age of five are almost 20 times more likely to die from diarrheal-disease linked to unsafe WASH than due as a result of collective violence.

The estimates were derived from WHO mortality estimates for ‘collective violence’ and ‘diarrheal deaths attributable to unsafe WASH’ between 2014 – 2016.

Multimedia materials available here: https://weshare.unicef.org/Package/2AMZIF3HHUU0

About UNICEF
UNICEF works in some of the world’s toughest places, to reach the world’s most disadvantaged children. Across more than 190 countries and territories, we work for every child, everywhere, to build a better world for everyone. For more information about UNICEF and its work for children visit www.unicef.org.

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For more information, please contact:
Joe English, UNICEF New York, Tel: + 1 917-893-0692 jenglish@unicef.org

Foreword from the Regional Director

Welcome to another edition of IOM’s regional bulletin for the East and Horn of Africa.

The months of February and March have been sad ones for IOM. In February, we were extremely saddened at the untimely passing of Patrick Sworo, a South Sudanese national who had worked as a Database Officer with IOM Burundi’s DTM team since October 2018. Described by colleagues as “always quick to smile or offer a kind word”, Patrick will be remembered for his gentle heart and strong commitment to serving the people of Burundi. While in March, a young IOM staff member,
Anne-Katrin Feigl - described by colleagues as committed and professional - was among those who perished when a Nairobi bound Ethiopian airlines plane crashed killing all the 157 people on board. Ms. Feigl, a German national worked as a Junior Professional Officer under the Better Migration Management programme. At least 22 UN staff were among the dead. Both Patrick and AnneKatrin were highly respected for their work and commitment. Our heartfelt condolences go to their families and loved ones.
On another sad note, the sinking of an overcrowded boat off the coast of Djibouti on 29 January resulted in the death of dozens of migrants. The accident occurred near Godoria in the Obock region, north-east of Djibouti. This hit home hard and was the latest tragedy from the Horn of Africa, highlighting that the region is not immune to tragedies of this nature. Indeed, the deadly passage of Africans to the Arabian Peninsula remains of concern to us.
Since the tragedy, the IOM office in Djibouti has reported receiving more requests from migrants seeking to voluntarily return to their home countries, mostly to neighbouring Ethiopia. Through the EU-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration in the Horn of Africa, IOM is working with authorities to assist these migrants, most of who are Ethiopian. In addition, IOM facilitated the return of Ethiopian migrants from Puntland. This comes amid an increase in the number of Ethiopians moving to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Also, in January, some 350 Ethiopians stranded in Yemen were assisted to return home under IOM’s Voluntary Humanitarian Return (VHR) flight operation. The group was among an estimated 3,000 migrants that IOM plans to assist through VHR in 2019. Yemen might be going through a devastating conflict but its proximity to the Horn of Africa means it remains a significant transit point for migrants seeking new livelihood opportunities. We expect mixed migration flows to Yemen to continue in 2019, underlining the importance of IOM’s Regional Migrant Response Plan for the Horn of Africa and Yemen.
Meanwhile, IOM is also continuing with relief efforts for internally displaced persons in Ethiopia.
According to the IOM DTM, there were some 2.3 million IDPs in Ethiopia as at December 2018.
On a different note, I would like to congratulate the government of South Sudan for collaborating with IOM in a bid to finalize the country’s first ever migration policy that will enhance its capacity to manage its borders while also protecting the rights of migrants. South Sudan is both a destination for many migrants and a transit country on the route to North Africa.
In Burundi, IOM is continuing to provide emergency shelter and non-food items in support of internally displaced persons along with Burundian refugees returning from the United Republic of Tanzania. This support will benefit some 13,000 people. In January, the IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix team identified some 134,000 IDPs in Burundi. This is a reduction from nearly 200,000 a few years ago.
We look forward to continuing to provide both development and humanitarian support to migrants in the region in collaboration with member states and our development partners.
Once again, thank you for the enduring support.

DTM’s Flow Monitoring Registry (FMR) surveys people on the move at key transit points within South Sudan and at its borders. It provides an insight into mobility trends and patterns, migration drivers and traveller profiles to inform programming by humanitarian and development partners and by the government.

Nineteen Flow Monitoring Points (FMPs) were active in February 2019, surveying internal flows and crossborder travel between South Sudan (SSD in graphs) and Uganda (UGA), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan (SDN).

Key Insights

• Short-term travel driven by economic reasons, access to goods and services and family visits accounts for most of the flows with Uganda and the DRC; seasonal migration driven by the approaching rains accounted for 20.0% of arrivals from Uganda.

• The net outflow to Uganda among respondents travelling for more than six months amounted to 1,083 individuals (1,948 individuals outgoing and 865 incoming); this is similar to the net outflow recorded in January (1,103 individuals).

• Out of 5,282 individuals who reported being forced to move,

78.0% intended to flee to Uganda, 11.4% came from the DRC to South Sudan (including 563 individuals to Yei and 39 to Yambio Counties) and 7.6% were being internally displaced (including 215 by violence within Yei County and 55 from Lainya to Yei).

• Among those fleeing South Sudan for Uganda, 96.5% intended to reach a refugee camp.

• The drivers of displacement are unchanged from January: food insecurity and, to a lower extent, generalised violence for displacement to Uganda, primarily generalised violence for internal displacement and food insecurity for secondary displacement from the DRC to South Sudan.

• The number of people travelling to and from Sudan via Abyei decreased relative to January; communal clashes culminating with the temporary closure of the Abyei Amieth market on 20 February may have contributed to this trend.

• Access to healthcare remained the key driver of migration to Sudan.

IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) interviewed 5,604 households (9,470 individuals) crossing into and out of Bentiu Protection of Civilians site (PoC) site, Malakal PoC site, Wau PoC Adjacent Area (AA) site and Wau collective centres (Cathedral, Nazareth, St. Joseph, Lokoloko and Masna combined in analysis) during January 2019.

In line with previous trends, DTM continued to witness comparatively large proportions of intended permanent exits at Wau PoC AA during the reporting period: 44% of interviewed at the site in Dec 2018 and 45% in Jan 2019 cited that they intended to exit the site permanently.
Trends amongst those traveling from Sudan mirrored those observed in the previous reporting period.

In both December and January, 18% of entering individuals (new entries [6%] and persons returning from temporary absences [12%]) arrived from Sudan. These arrivals were primarily observed at Bentiu PoC site, with an increasing proportion of persons returning to Malakal PoC site from Sudan after longer absences. Whilst new arrivals from Sudan cited family as their primary reason for entering the site, those returning after an absence had usually been in Sudan to access basic services such as healthcare and education. Almost all new arrivals from Sudan already had family at the sites (98%).

For information on locations of travel please consult pages 7 (temporary movement), 8 (new arrivals) and 9 (intended permanent exits).

By interviewing a cross-section of all people passing through the gates, DTM aims to provide partners and policymakers with a better understanding of movement dynamics and factors underpinning short, medium and long-term absences. Please note that interviews are conducted 7 days a week from 8am to 5pm at the sites’ main gates. Respondents are chosen randomly. Due to the large volume of ow, ndings remain indicative only. Kindly consult headcount data for a better understanding of site populations and their evolution.

As part of IOM’s Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) preparedness activities, DTM operates seven Flow Monitoring Points (FMPs) in Yambio, Yei and Morobo counties and six in cooperation with DTM Uganda on the Ugandan side of the border. Additional FMPs are planned on the borders with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic. This dashboard highlights key entry routes to South Sudan (SSD) and presents the demographic profile of people surveyed on arrival from the DRC and Uganda (UGA). Participation in the survey is voluntary and the data collected is only indicative of actual flows.

Key Insights

• The number of people surveyed on arrival increased by 3,708 relative to January as a result of improved monitoring of border crossings.

• 74.0% of respondents departed from Uganda,

25.1% from the DRC and 0.9% from other countries.

• The data shows significant movement between Morobo and contiguous cross-border regions in both Uganda and the DRC.

• A similar pattern applies to other border counties, but with lower traffic. This may be due, in part, to access constraints affecting DTM’s ability to track flows.

• 11.5% of respondents (2,570 people) reported entering South Sudan to access health care.

• 5.9% of respondents (1,314 people) reported Juba County as their intended destination.

• The percentage of respondents who reported coming from a refugee camp is 16.2% for arrivals from Uganda and 18.2% for the DRC.