BESOINS HUMANITAIRES ET CHIFFRES CLÉS

La crise humanitaire que traverse la Centrafrique demeure complexe. Un total de 621 035 personnes sont déplacées à l’intérieur du pays et 572 984 personnes dans les pays voisins à la fin du mois d’août 2018. Le nombre de personnes dans le besoin est passé de 2,5 millions à 2,9 millions dont 1,6 million en besoin d’assistance aiguë et immédiate, soit une augmentation de 16% par rapport à l’année 2017. Cette augmentation est la conséquence directe de la multiplication des foyers de conflit dans plusieurs régions du pays, du nombre croissant d’incidents sécuritaires affectant les civils et les humanitaires, et du manque de ressources nécessaires qui mettent en péril les efforts de restauration des services de base. Les conséquences humanitaires de cette crise sont ressenties dans les domaines de la protection, du déplacement forcé des populations et de l’accès aux services sociaux de base.

PROTECTION DES CIVILS

La crise en RCA reste principalement une crise de protection. Du 01 janvier au 30 août 2018, 7 270 incidents de protection sur les populations civiles ont été rapportés. Les acteurs humanitaires sont de plus en plus ciblés et le nombre d’incidents contre les humanitaires a augmenté passant de 232 en 2017 à 316 en 2018 (janvier –fin septembre 2018).
Plusieurs organisations se sont retirées temporairement des localités attaquées privant les populations vulnérables de l’assistance humanitaire dont elles ont grandement besoin.

BESOINS GÉNÉRÉS PAR LES MOUVEMENTS DE POPULATION

La résurgence des conflits entre groupes armés, l’insécurité et les attaques contre les civils continuent à provoquer des déplacements de populations.
Plus d’1 million de personnes vivent actuellement hors de chez elles, soit plus de 621 000 déplacés internes et plus de 573 000 réfugiés dans les pays voisins.
En revanche, l’accalmie observée ces derniers mois dans certaines préfectures a encouragé plus de 300 000 personnes à retourner dans leurs milieux d’origine qui, dans la plupart de cas, sont soit incendiés soit en décrépitude avancée. Les retournés se trouvent également confrontés à des besoins spécifiques pour la survie au regard des capacités et moyens de subsistance limités.

ACCÈS AUX SERVICES ESSENTIELS

Les conflits armés ainsi que le faible taux d’investissements publics aussi bien au niveau central que local à travers le pays ont fortement contribué à la détérioration des services essentiels de base. Les conséquences sur les populations en sont multiples, notamment l’accès difficile aux soins étant donné que 236 (23%) formations sanitaires sont partiellement ou totalement détruites, 244 (24%) sont partiellement ou non fonctionnelles ; moins de 30% d’accès à l’eau potable ; 1,9 millions de personnes en insécurité alimentaire ; 39 sous-préfectures sanitaires sur 71 avec des taux de malnutrition aigüe sévère supérieurs à 2%.

IMPACT DE LA CRISE

Malgré une certaine accalmie observée dans le pays après l’installation des institutions élues en 2016-2017, la recrudescence des violences à partir de la fin de l’année 2017 a replongé la population dans une vague d’insécurité dans plusieurs régions du pays. Cette détérioration a affecté davantage le tissu socio-économique et exacerbé les besoins humanitaires pour des populations déjà vulnérables.

La fragilité des institutions étatiques et l’insécurité

Malgré les efforts en cours pour le redéploiement de l’autorité de l’Etat dans son volet politico-administratif (préfets, sous-préfets, et maires), plus de la moitié du territoire centrafricain reste confrontée à une forte instabilité, avec une présence des groupes armés et des milices d’autodéfense qui ont érigé de véritables administrations parallèles leur garantissant un ancrage territorial fort. A cause de l’insécurité, la plupart de ces autorités, y compris les responsables des services techniques de l’Etat se sont vus obligés de se déplacer à Bangui ou vers d’autres localités. Bien que signé depuis 2015, le programme de Désarmement, de démobilisation et de réinsertion (DDR) des milices armées tarde à se concrétiser.

Outre l’impact sécuritaire et économique très négatif sur les communautés (pillages de biens, taxes illégales), l’insécurité sur les routes et axes principaux handicape très fortement la fourniture de l’aide humanitaire. En 2018, 46 véhicules des acteurs humanitaires ont été braqués dans les préfectures de la Nana Gribizi, (21), de l’Ouham (12), de la Ouaka (8), de la Kémo (2), de l’Ouham Pendé (1), et à Bangui (2). Par ailleurs, 29 véhicules ont été volés à Bangui (8), dans la Ouaka (6), dans la Nana Gribizi (5), dans le Mbomou (4), dans la Nana Mambéré (4) et dans l’Ouham (2).

Les tensions intercommunautaires

En 2018, les affrontements récurrents et localisés ont occasionné une augmentation des tensions intercommunautaires à Bangui et dans plusieurs localités de l’arrière-pays, notamment dans la Haute Kotto, la Basse Kotto, la Nana-Gribizi, l’Ouham, la Ouaka, le Mbomou et le Haut Mbomou, brisant la fragile cohésion sociale dans ces parties du pays.

Dans certaines préfectures, le lien entre groupes armés et communautés est fortement ressenti et contribue à la persistance des conflits : les combattants apparaissent comme les protecteurs d’une communauté déterminée. Cette communautarisation du conflit se traduit notamment par des cycles de représailles violents et répétés, entrainant des mouvements de populations récurrents.

La problématique de la transhumance

Le phénomène de la transhumance dans le Nord-Ouest (région de Bouar-Bocaranga-Baboua), l’Ouest (région de Berberati, Gamboula, Amada-Gaza), le Centre-Ouest (région de Bossembéle-Yaloké), le Centre-Est (région de Kouango-Bambari-Alindao-Kembé), le Nord de la préfecture de l’Ouham et dans la Nana Gribizi, a périodiquement des conséquences désastreuses sur ces zones. Les relations déjà difficiles entre les éleveurs transhumants étrangers (notamment tchadiens et soudanais) et les populations d’agriculteurs autochtones se sont dégradées au fil des années donnant lieu à de nombreux conflits intercommunautaires de plus en plus violents. Les Nations Unies estiment qu’environ 1,1 million de personnes sont dans le besoin dans les zones affectées par le phénomène de la transhumance.

Depuis 2013, ce phénomène n’est plus contrôlé et régulé par le gouvernement. Le vol régulier de bétail appartenant à la communauté peuhle par des éléments armés, les rivalités entre les groupes armés autoproclamés protecteurs des éleveurs ou des agriculteurs et la militarisation des éleveurs, accentuent les risques de conflit intercommunautaire et renforcent la méfiance entre les éleveurs et les agriculteurs. Le délitement des structures traditionnelles de médiation de conflit entre agriculteurs et éleveurs et la désorganisation des couloirs de transhumance, ainsi que la destruction des champs par le bétail des transhumants sont aussi de nature à déclencher des conflits.

La pauvreté chronique

La RCA est l'un des pays les plus pauvres au monde et se trouve à l’avant dernier rang du classement mondial (188/189) selon l’indice de développement humain de 2018. La persistance de l’insécurité sur une grande partie du territoire nationale a notamment freiné la relance du secteur agricole et la concrétisation des investissements étrangers directs (IDE). L’exil des commerçants, les fréquentes attaques de convois transportant des biens ou des marchandises et l’état défectueux des routes sont autant d’entraves à l’approvisionnement des marchés en marchandises et en intrants. Cet état de fait donne par conséquent lieu à une augmentation des prix dans certaines localités. L’activité économique reste faible depuis 2013.

Le niveau de pauvreté structurelle s’est davantage aggravé avec la récurrence du déplacement massif des populations et la perte des capacités de production des populations affectées. Il est passé de 62 % en 2008 à 75 % en 20171 . Les ménages les plus pauvres se trouvent en milieu rural, même si la répartition spatiale de la pauvreté varie selon les régions. L’inégalité de revenus est également très prononcée : la RCA détient l’un des indices de Gini le plus élevé au monde (63). Le taux de chômage reste élevé et près d’un individu actif sur quatre (24,2 %) est sans emploi. Hormis les inégalités de revenus, l'accès aux services d’éducation et de santé de base n'est pas assuré de manière équitable dans les différentes régions du pays. L'espérance de vie à la naissance (52,9 ans) est la deuxième plus faible au monde.

PRES DE 13,1 MILLIONS DE PERSONNES ISSUES DES MILIEUX RURAUX VIVENT EN INSECURITE ALIMENTAIRE AIGUË CORRESPONDANT AUX PHASES DE CRISE (3) ET D’URGENCE (4) DE LA CLASSIFICATION INTERNATIONALE DE L’IPC

PRINCIPALES CONCLUSIONS

L’analyse intégrée de la sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle menée en juin 2018 révèle une situation préoccupante pour 23% de la population rurale alors que le pays disposerait d’un potentiel agricole pour nourrir environ 2 milliards de personnes. Cet exercice a bénéficié des résultats de l’évaluation de la campagne agricole 2017-2018 qui a permis de quantifier le déficit alimentaire net à 22%, ce qui corrobore l’estimation des 23% de ruraux en situation de crise alimentaire conduisant aux conclusions suivantes :

• Environ 13,1 millions de personnes sont estimées en phases 3 et 4 (phase de crise alimentaire et des moyens d’existence aiguë). Ceci représente 23% de la population rurale des 101 territoires sur un total de 145 territoires ;

• Les zones affectées par les conflits armés et inter-ethnique/communautaire continuent à être les plus vulnérables à l’insécurité alimentaire aiguë. En effet, 9 territoires ont été classés en phase 4 ou phase d’urgence. Il s’agit des territoires de Djugu (Ituri) ; Kalemie, Nyunzu et Manono (Tanganyika) ; Mitwaba et Pweto (Haut Katanga) ;
  Kamonia et Mweka (Kasaï) ; et Miabi (Kasaï-Oriental). Trente et un autres territoires en phase 3 sont éparpillés à travers le pays, y compris dans les zones dites stables ;

• Plusieurs facteurs sont à la base de cette détérioration globale de la sécurité alimentaire observée entre juin 2017 et juin 2018. Il s’agit principalement de la montée marquée des conflits armés dans le pays en 2017, particulièrement en Ituri et Sud-Kivu et l’extension des affrontements dans le Tanganyika et le grand Kasaï. Ces conflits ont provoqué de nouveaux déplacements des populations et détérioré davantage la sécurité alimentaire des ménages ;

• Le narratif commun de la nutrition en RDC évalue à environ 6 millions d’enfants malnutris et 7,2 millions de femmes souffrant d’anémie confirmant l’ordre de grandeur estimé par l’IPC 2018 ;

• Le nombre des zones de santé en alerte est passé de 7,5% en 2017 à 14% de l’ensemble des zones de santé du pays en 2018 ;

• Faible couverture sanitaire pour les femmes enceintes, allaitantes et les enfants en particulier en plus d’une économie rurale limitée à la subsistance ;

• Près de 50% des pertes de production du maïs dues à la chenille légionnaire d’automne et autres ravageurs de cultures ;

• Pauvreté généralisée en milieu rural limitant l’accès financier aux services de base et à certains groupes d’aliments riches en protéine animale.

Executive Summary

Uganda, in many ways, is ground zero for new global initiatives to address large-scale, protracted displacement. It has hosted refugees from neighboring countries for decades, and today hosts the largest refugee population in Africa.

At the 2016 Leaders’ Summit on Refugees and Migrants, Uganda doubled down on its progressive refugee policies, which allow refugees to work, go to school and access land. It opted to be the first country to pilot the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework of the New York Declaration. And it is among the first countries to receive financing through a new sub-window of the World Bank’s 18th replenishment of its International Development Association (IDA18), created to provide additional concessional financing to low-income countries hosting large numbers of refugees. Together, these commitments, framework and financing offer immense potential to meaningfully improve the lives of refugees and Ugandan host communities.

All eyes are on Uganda as an early adopter of these new tools and funding. How will World Bank-funded projects be balanced with existing humanitarian interventions for refugees—which are extensive in Uganda? How will the Bank interact with the complex set of actors, including the government, UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), non-governmental actors (NGOs), civil society, and refugees themselves? Will the Bank adapt its projects or move forward with business as usual in these unique contexts? Will the Bank’s initiatives encourage other donors to provide multiyear financing and support long-term solutions for refugees and host communities?

This case study starts to answer these questions by examining Uganda’s recent policy approaches and initiatives that respond to refugee and host populations. Although it is still early days, observations so far suggest mixed results. The Government’s willingness to engage with these new platforms and maintain its progressive refugee policies, especially in the face of global actors retreating from their share in the responsibility for responding to refugee crises, is impressive and important.

However, early concerns about implementation have been, in some instances, validated. While the World Bank’s financing and CRRF are “pulling in the same direction”, there are no formal agreed on outcomes and no formal linkages between the funding and the framework. The process for making decisions about policies and programs have seemingly marginalizes NGOs and refugees themselves, even though there are new structures meant to give them a voice. And most Bank-funded projects in the pipeline piggyback on existing Bank programs, bringing refugees into projects that were already in train; it is unclear to what extent these projects will adapt to reflect refugees’ experiences.

Based on these observations, this case study offers recommendations for the Government of Uganda, donors like the World Bank, UNHCR and other stakeholders. It calls on the Government to foster better coordination and collaboration between different levels of government and to lead on simplifying and aligning decision-making processes for the CRRF implementation and World Bank financing. It recommends the World Bank and UNHCR develop more deliberate consultative process to include a broader range of actors; help bring other development actors to the table; and to work with partners to identify a clear set of outcomes they want to achieve with the new financing and frameworks. It suggests NGOs more proactively engage with the World Bank to share their expertise and help shape program and policy decisions based on their years of working with refugees.

Executive Summary

In 2016, the Government of Ethiopia made nine pledges to improve the lives of refugees and host communities. Soon thereafter it rolled out the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) of the New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants, and became one the first countries to receive multiyear, concessional financing from the World Bank’s 18th replenishment of the International Development Association (IDA18) sub-window for refugee-hosting nations. Together, these commitments, framework and financing hold the promise of significantly improving the lives of refugees and their host communities across the country.

New policies and programs are underway. The Government is revising its Refugee Proclamation and is expected to expand its policies that will enable more refugees to move freely from camps and access education and jobs. New livelihoods and education projects, supported by the World Bank and UK’s Department for International Development, are being designed to support refugees and host communities. Although still early in his tenure, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali appears reform-minded and could be a champion of these approaches to the protracted refugee situation.

While progress is being made, there are a number of concerns that, if not addressed, run the risk of hampering impact. The Bank’s working groups for sub-window financed projects are distinct from CRRF working groups, and both appear to have consultative processes that often leave key constituencies, such as refugees, local governments and regional bodies, out of decision-making regarding policies and program design. The World Bank’s earliest investments are weighted towards solutions like industrial parks that do not adequately address refugees’ barriers to decent work and are unlikely to generate enough jobs in the medium term. And the government has not yet passed the Refugee Proclamation—key to ensuring refugees can access their rights, and critical for Bank programs to begin in earnest.

This case study seeks to determine what impact the CRRF and development financing are having—and are likely to have moving forward. Based on these observations, this case study offers recommendations for the Government of Ethiopia, the World Bank, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), Ethiopia’s Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA), NGOs and other stakeholders. It calls on the Government to swiftly pass the Refugee Proclamation, allowing refugees to move more freely, and access schools and formal jobs. It recommends the World Bank, UNHCR and ARRA streamline their multistakeholder engagement process to ensure key actors, such as different levels of government, regional bodies, refugees, and NGOs can contribute to decision-making processes; and to ensure projects adequately reflect the evidence base, for instance on refugee and host community livelihood skills and needs.

Lisa Schlein

GENEVA — The U.N. secretary-general's special representative for children and armed conflict says a chief benefit of peace in South Sudan is the likelihood that many child soldiers will be freed and reintegrated into their communities.

Virginia Gamba was present during the Khartoum peace process in South Sudan three weeks ago and met with government officials and members of the warring factions. She also visited camps where she met and talked with child soldiers. She said her experiences convinced her that prospects for the separation and release of children were very high.

So far this year, she said, 900 child soldiers have been freed. If the peace holds, it is possible that as many as 1,000 more children will be released by the end of the year, Gamba said.

Once the children are released, she said, they must go through a process of integration, and that could be problematic.

"The fear I have is that the amount of children that will be released in the next few months is such that UNICEF and partners will not have enough resources to handle the reintegration at one go ... which means a lot of children are punished by staying in the bush without a chance of reintegration until we have the capacity to absorb them," she said.

Appeal for funds

Gamba appealed to the international community to provide aid agencies with the money they need to reintegrate the child soldiers into their communities, so they can be given a fresh start.

She said recruitment as soldiers was only one of many violations to which children have been subjected. She said acts of violence against children in South Sudan were the worst she had ever seen, including in Afghanistan and Syria.

Gamba said gross violations included decapitation, the use of sexual violence against very small children as a weapon of war, abductions, and the forced use of children to support the war effort.

She said all of the warring parties — government and rebel forces alike — were guilty of these crimes and must be held accountable for them.

104 Cases of SGBV successfully closed since January 2018 in Unity

140,000 litres Of additional water available for use in Upper Nile

95% pass rate of Primary 8 students from three refugee primary schools in Ajuong Thok refugee camp in Unity after their mock exams

REFUGEE RESPONSE

PROTECTION

Achievements and Impact

Western Equatoria

• UNHCR registered 75 newly arrived refugees (30 families) in Yambio.
  

Unity

• In Jamjang, UNHCR registered 375 (211 men, 164 women) newly arrived refugees from South Kordofan which is a decrease of 41% compared to the same period last year.
  
• UNHCR relocated 309 refugees from Yida to two refugee camps in Jamjang; 13 refugees to Ajuong Thok refugee camp, 296 refugees to Pamir refugee camp. Among them, 218 were new arrivals while 91 were Yida residual refugees.
  
• On 5th October, UNHCR launched a verification exercise in Ajuong Thok refugee camp. By 15th October, UNHCR verified 9,393 refugees, 20% of the target population.
  
• Five Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) cases (3-emotional abuse, 2-physical assault) were closed after survivors were determined to have fully recovered. Since January 2018, 104 SGBV cases have been closed (52-Ajuong Thok, 39-Pamir, 13 -Yida).

1. Situation update

The Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak in North Kivu and Ituri provinces, Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to be closely monitored by the Ministry of Health (MoH), WHO and partners. Since WHO’s last situation report issued on 30 October 2018 (External Situation Report 13) reporting on data as of 28 October, an additional 26 new confirmed EVD cases and 12 new deaths have been reported. Cases were reported from Beni (n=16), Butembo (n=6), Mabalako (n=2), Kalunguta (n=1) and Vuhovi (n=1) – a health zone between Beni and Butembo. The two cases reported in Mabalako are a mother and her new-born, residing and identified in Beni, who were transferred to the Mabalako Ebola treatment centre (ETC). Among the new confirmed cases from Beni were two nurses, thus bringing the number of affected health workers to 27, including 26 confirmed and three deaths. Among the 12 deaths reported, six occurred in ETCs and six occurred outside of ETCs (4 in Beni, 1 in Butembo, 1 in Vuhovi).

As of 4 November 2018, a total of 300 EVD cases, including 265 confirmed and 35 probable cases, have been reported (Table 1). The cases have been reported from eight health zones in North Kivu Province and three health zones in Ituri Province (Figure 3). Among the 300 cases, 186 deaths have been reported among confirmed cases (n=151) and probable cases (n=35) – a case fatality ratio (CFR) of 62% (186/300). Among the 295 cases with known age and sex, 59% (n=175) were female, and adults aged 15-44 accounted for 59% (n=174) of cases (Figure 2).

Fifteen additional cases have recovered and been discharged this past week; 14 from Beni ETC and one from Butembo ETC. As of 4 November 2018, 88 cases have recovered. On 4 November 2018, 91 patients (61 suspected and 30 confirmed cases) remained hospitalized at the ETCs.

The MoH, WHO and partners are monitoring and investigating all alerts in affected areas, in other provinces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in neighbouring countries. Since the last report was published, alerts were investigated in several provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo as well as in South Sudan, Uganda and Yemen. To date, EVD has been ruled out in all alerts from neighbouring provinces and countries.

November 6, 2108 (JUBA) - Officials from the South Sudanese government army, SSPDF, and the main opposition army, SPLA-IO, agreed to allow humanitarian access and free movement of people around Juba.

Upon the instruction of their two chiefs of staff, the SPLA-IO forces based around Juba, and their peace partners from the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) held a meeting on Sunday 4 November to discuss security measures to ensure humanitarian access to civilians and enable free movement of persons and goods.

In a statement released on Tuesday, SPLA IO Deputy Military Spokesperson Lam Paul Gabriel said the meeting was fruitful. He further said the SSPDF delegation was led by Brig Gen Chol Deng Chol was known as Chol Gutkom and the SPLA delegation was headed by Brig. Gen Warnyang Laku Buyu.

The meeting agreed to "give humanitarian organizations unhindered access to the most vulnerable population so that basic services can be provided to them," he said.

He further said that the two delegations agreed to allow "free movement of soldiers or security personnel with departure orders," he said before to add that "The soldier must be unarmed and in none uniform".

The two peace partners who will form the new national army agreed also to permit free movement of civilians, non-military logistics and goods through or to the SPLA-Io controlled areas.

This measure means that all the roads from North of Juba to Terekeka, Mundri and to Lainya should be open to everyone. There will be no detention or checking "unless a person is carrying a gun and wearing uniform".

President Salva Kiir and SPLM-IO leader Riek Machar repeated that ending the suffering of civilians was their principal motivation to strike the revitalized peace agreement in order to end the five-year war.

The signed deal is in line with the security arrangement of the signed revitalized peace agreement which provides that the signatories allow and facilitate unfettered access for people in need of humanitarian assistance and to guarantee free movement of citizens, commodities and services.

The peace agreement provides that 15 days after the signing of the deal the parties have to implement all the ceasefire arrangements including, disengagement and separation of forces in close proximity; withdrawal of allied troops; and the opening of humanitarian corridors.

IGAD military assessment mission headed by a Sudanese general arrived Monday to Juba to study the status of the Regional Protection Force as the regional body will deploy its troops within it.

In a meeting held in Khartoum on 22 October, the IGAD chiefs of staff decided the formation of the mission and agreed that t should submit its report on 19 November 2018 to the next meeting of the chiefs of staff In Ethiopia.

(ST)

FRANCESCA MOLD

James Korok is just nineteen-years-old but has already experienced a lifetime of pain, fighting as a child soldier in the war in South Sudan.

Despite that, he is one of the lucky ones. Released by the armed forces in remote Pibor, James is back in school and earning US$60 a week after learning new tailoring skills.

“Before I joined the war, I had no ability to support my family but now I am working, I can make some clothes, like school uniforms, to help my family,” he says.

Members of the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict are visiting South Sudan to hear from young people, like James, who have suffered immensely during the war. The Group is advocating for stronger protections and an end to gross violations, including maiming and killing, rape and sexual violence and the forcible recruitment of children into armed forces. Its work is supported by the diplomatic community in Juba through the establishment of the Group of Friends of Children and Armed Conflict.

“The war is taking a very, very big toll on the children of this country and the scar remains deep so it is very important now to turn a corner, to work very actively with the children,” says the Working Group Chair and Swedish Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador Olof Skoog.

Children in South Sudan are, not only, suffering from war, but also rampant intercommunal violence, including brutal incidents of cattle raiding, where many young people are killed or abducted.

“So, someone can go and get maybe a child and sell it to someone else who does not have children,” says Boma Governor, David Yau-Yau. “It has become a main business. If it gets to that situation, it is very difficult to put an end to it in one day. It requires a lot of muscle to put an end to this.”

The Governor argues that there is an urgent need for greater investment in schools and training opportunities to ensure that former soldiers can support themselves rather than turning to criminality or fighting to survive. He says it is too easy for children to be simply given school bags and books – a gift that is wasted if they have nowhere to go to learn.

“After we demobilize these children, we need to take time to change their mindset from the military set-up,” he says. “Some of them have been with the military quite a long time. If we just demobilize them in a short period and leave them as if they are already going back to their normal life within the community circle, who knows, maybe they will just go back again to the military? It becomes a vicious cycle.”

The Working Group supports the call for greater investment in reintegration programmes.

“I think you realize, when you meet these kids and you see the work that is needed to fully reintegrate them, that there are a lot of resources needed, a lot of time and patience and some of those resources, I think, are still lacking,” says Ambassador Olof Skoog. “There are still vulnerable communities there, schools are not really up and running the way they should be. So, unless you get all of that in place, some of this work will not be totally satisfactory.”

Seventeen-year-old Jimmy was forced to go into the army after his father died so he could support his family. He is shy and reluctant to say too much about his time fighting in the bush.

“Killing and so on. I have seen that if you kill someone it is not good. It is the reason I got out of the army.”

Jimmy says he’s happier now he is learning carpentry and selling chairs, tables and drums to make a living. When prodded on this because of his sad face as he speaks, he says: “I’m happy. If you just see me, I’m not smiling, but I’m smiling in my heart.”

The conflict in South Sudan has had a devastating effect on the children in the country and has left deep scars in the next generation. The Revitalized Peace Agreement represents an opportunity to turn a corner and make the protection of children a priority as the country moves forward.

The Working Group met with senior Government officials, including with the First Vice President H.E M.
Taban Deng Gai, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Gender Child and Social Welfare, the Chief of Defense Forces and Head of the South Sudan People’s Defense Forces (SSPDF), the Inspector General of the Police, the Chairperson of the National DDR Commission, the Governors of Boma and Jonglei as well as representatives of other relevant ministries and security forces.

The Working Group also had the chance to visit reintegration programmes including vocational centers for children previously recruited or used by parties to conflict in Pibor and Bor as well as to engage with the Co-Chairs of the United Nations Country Task Force for Monitoring and Reporting (CTFMR) – UNMISS and UNICEF – with other UN representatives, international and local NGOs, faith-based organizations and with the diplomatic community through the Group of Friends of Children and Armed Conflict in Juba.

We are encouraged by the commitment to improve the situation of children affected by armed conflict in South Sudan expressed by our interlocutors, and the demobilisation, release and reintegration of hundreds of children in 2018 and the recent accession by the Government to the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on Children in Armed Conflict.

We have presented recommendations to the Government on the way forward, including:

• work with the United Nations to expand the current Action Plan into a comprehensive Action Plan that would address all six grave violations in order to end and prevent all violations and abuses against children;

• revitalize the inter-ministerial high-level and technical committees at National and State level before the end of the year, as these committees will be key in developing and overseeing the implementation of the Action Plan together with the United Nations;

• continue to facilitate the release and reintegration of children as part of the implementation of the Revitalized Peace Agreement (R-ARCSS) and allocate sufficient funds to the reintegration of children formerly associated with armed forces or armed groups into their communities;

• enhance accountability by enforcing existing national legislation and establishing specialized national capacity within key civilian and military justice authorities that would be able to investigate and prosecute serious conflict-related cases, including grave violations against children;

• criminalize the six grave violations against children in the upcoming review of the Penal Code;

• strengthen birth registration by ensuring that the Civil Registry Law is passed into law.

In addition, the delegation encouraged further engagement by the UN CTFMR with the pro-Machar SPLAIO faction on the Action Plan on recruitment and use and killing and maiming signed with the United Nations in 2015.

In Bor and Pibor, the Working Group had the chance to meet with children affected by armed conflict that have been released from parties to conflict during 2018 and that are now benefitting from reintegration support by UNICEF and implementing partners.

The delegation could see first-hand the immense challenges faced by the child protection actors working in the conflict-affected area to meet the reintegration needs of the many children released, including psycho-social support and programmes that address the specific needs of girls and boys. The working group acknowledged and congratulated the often life-saving efforts made for children by humanitarian actors, often at great personal risk. The working group encouraged the donor community to step-up their commitment to reintegration programming, in particular in light of the peace agreement, which may enable the release of more children in the coming months.

These challenges were reiterated in conversations with international and national NGOs as well as with faith-based organisations, who urged the Government and the international community to place children, as the future of the country, at the heart of the peace process and invest in reintegration and education.

The delegation welcomed the momentum provided by the Group of Friends on Children and Armed Conflict in Juba, composed in-country diplomatic delegations, and encouraged the group to continue to engage with parties to conflict, in particular with the Government, and follow-up on the visit of the Working Group.

The Security Council Working Group looks forward to continuing its engagement with South Sudan.

For more information, please, contact:

Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict communications officer Fabienne Vinet at vinet@un.org UNMISS Acting Spokesperson Francesca Mold at mold2@un.org UNICEF communications specialist James Aldworth at jaldworth@unicef.org

Background

The Logistics Cluster facilitates the coordination of the logistics response in support of the humanitarian community. Furthermore, it provides information management products to improve the decision making of humanitarian organisations in South Sudan. Where logistics gaps are identified, WFP, as the lead agency of the Logistics Cluster, acts as a Provider of Last Resort by offering common logistics services to support the humanitarian community in their response operations.

Operational Highlights

• In October, the Logistics Cluster facilitated the transport of 559 mt of humanitarian cargo by road, air and river to 40 destinations on behalf of 77 organisations. Most of the cargo was transported by air using helicopters and a fixed-wing plane to access hard to reach destinations.
• During the month, the Logistics Cluster coordinated one inter-agency convoy of 12 vehicles transporting humanitarian supplies along the Western Corridor on behalf of UNICEF and IOM.

Executive summary

This report is the latest release by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) on the economic impact of violence and conflict to the global economy. It provides an empirical basis for understanding the economic benefits resulting from improvements in peace. Estimates of the economic impact of violence are provided for 163 countries and independent territories, covering over 99.5 per cent of the global population.

The economic impact of violence to the global economy was $14.76 trillion in 2017, in constant purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. This figure is equivalent to 12.4 per cent of global gross domestic product (GDP) or $1,988 per person. Given there are categories of violence that impose costs but where no reliable prevalence data is available, the estimates presented in this report are considered to be conservative.

The global economic impact of violence rose by two per cent during 2017, due to increases in cost of conflict and internal security spending. The rise in the economic impact of violence coincides with a 0.27 per cent deterioration in peace, as measured by Global Peace Index (GPI) 2018.
Since 2012, the economic impact of violence has increased by 16 per cent, corresponding with the start of the Syrian war and the rise of Islamic State. The intensification of conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have also added to the economic impact.

Violence has adverse implications for the broader economy, both in the short and long term, and imposes substantial economic costs on society. The economic impact of violence in the ten most affected countries was equivalent to 45 per cent of their GDP. This is approximately 19 times higher than the ten countries least affected by violence in which the average economic cost of violence is just over two per cent of GDP. This is also significantly smaller than the global average economic cost of violence, which amounts to 11 per cent of GDP.

The composition of the economic impact of violence varies across countries and regions. For instance, the cost of homicide and violent crime represents the highest proportion in South America and Central America and the Caribbean at 67 and 60 per cent respectively. Conversely, the cost of conflict as a proportion of the economic cost of violence is highest in the Middle East and North Africa at 28 per cent and South Asia at 24 per cent. Both forms of violence affect sub-Saharan Africa with homicide and violent crime constituting 57 per cent of the regional cost and violent conflict accounting for another 16 per cent. The countries with the highest economic impact of violence include conflict-affected countries — Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Colombia, South Sudan, Somalia, and the Central African Republic — and countries with high interpersonal violence such as El Salvador and Lesotho.

The single largest contributor to the global economic impact of violence, at over 37 per cent of the total, was military expenditure at $5.5 trillion PPP. Internal security spending was the second largest component, comprising over 27 per cent of the global economic impact of violence, totalling $3.8 trillion.

Internal security expenditure encompasses spending on police, judicial and prison system outlays.
Violence not only has a direct impact on the economy, it also reduces the positive benefits that peacefulness has on the macroeconomic performance of countries. In the last 60 years, per capita growth has been three times higher in highly peaceful countries when compared to countries with low levels of peace. The difference is more pronounced over the last decade, where GDP growth has been seven times higher among countries that improved in peace when compared to countries that deteriorated in peace.

IEP’s methodology for accounting the economic impact of violence and conflict aggregates 17 indicators that relate to public and private expenditure required to “contain, prevent and deal with the consequences of violence”. Using the underlying measurements in the GPI costs are calculated by totalling the scaled unit costs for different types of violence.

The model includes both direct and indirect costs of violence and divides them into three domains; (1) security services and prevention oriented costs, (2) armed conflict related costs and (3) consequential costs of interpersonal violence. Examples of direct costs include medical costs for victims of violent crime, capital destruction from violence and costs associated with security and judicial systems. Indirect costs are economic losses that result from violence. For example, this may include the decreased productivity resulting from an injury, lost life-time economic output of the victim of a murder, pain and trauma stemming from being a victim of violence and the yearly reduced economic growth resulting from a prolonged war or conflict. A ‘multiplier effect’ is also included to represent the lost opportunity cost of violence. When peacefulness improves, money saved from containing violence can be redirected to more productive activities, yielding higher returns and increasing GDP.

Analysis of the economic impact of violence for 2017 provides two important results. Firstly, it highlights the extent that armed conflict negatively affects the economy. The economic cost of violence in Syria, Afghanistan, and South Sudan, was equivalent to 68, 63 and 49 per cent of GDP respectively. Citizens of these countries are now among the most vulnerable and constitute a large percentage of the global refugee population.

The second major finding is that there has been a reduction in military and internal security expenditure, especially among the advanced economies. Global military expenditure has stayed constant since 2010 following a significant increase of 46 per cent between 2000 and 2009. The reduction coincides with austerity related policies implemented by countries affected by the global financial crisis in 2008. However, this trend may reverse in the coming years given commitments to increase military budgets in the US and Europe. At the same time, China is increasing spending on both its military and internal security.

Due to their large military and internal security budgets, Asia-Pacific, North America and Europe are the regions with the largest expenditures at $2.86, $2.72 and $2.31 trillion respectively in purchasing power parity terms.

The report compares losses from violence to the cost of containing and preventing it with the aim to assess the optimal level of spending on violence containment. The research shows a distinct link between the broader environment for Positive Peace and the level of spending required to contain violence.

The Positive Peace framework captures the attitudes, institutions, and structures which create and sustain peaceful societies. The analysis finds that countries with the highest levels of Positive Peace spend one to two per cent of GDP on internal security, whereas countries with median levels of Positive Peace tend to spend more. Switzerland, Iceland and Canada for example rank among the 15 most peaceful countries in the Positive Peace Index as well as having some of the lowest economic cost of violence.

Meanwhile, those countries with the lowest levels of Positive Peace and resilience generally spend less than one per cent of GDP on internal security, highlighting an underinvestment in violence containment. This is common among low income, fragile and conflict-affected countries which tend to spend onla fraction of the per capita costs relative to that of higher income countries.

In the absence of Positive Peace, reduced spending on violence prevention will likely result in higher costs from violence.

However, excessive spending on violence containment can lead to deteriorations in peacefulness. For instance, a larger than required military might lead a country to pursue larger geopolitical goals, creating violence elsewhere. Similarly, large investments in police forces might lead to repression in a society and limit the basic rights of the citizen. Evaluating the trade-off between prevention and costs from violence sheds light on optimal levels of spending to address violence effectively. The systemic interaction between violence containment, violence and Positive Peace is the subject of ongoing research.

186,001 The number of refugees and asylum seekers registered in Kakuma camp and Kalobeyei settlement as at 31 October 2018.

8,637 The number of new arrivals refugees and asylum seekers registered in 2018.

4,088 Individuals assisted to return to their home countries since February 2016.

Highlights

Burundian refugee’s soap products meets Kenya national quality mark: Innocent Havyarimana, a refugee from Burundi who lives in Kakuma camp, “I use the internet a lot to conduct research on how to make different types of soap products for my clients. I learnt the theory in Burundi where I studied chemistry”. Read more: http://www.unhcr.org/ke/14369-burundian-refugee-soap-products-meet-kenyanational-quality-mark.html

Refugee Students at M-Pesa Foundation Academy hone their skills in entrepreneurship, leadership and sports:
In 2018, the M-Pesa Academy accorded UNHCR the status of a county and for the first time admitted six refugees to the institution. This is a significant step towards offering refugees opportunities for post primary education. According to UNHCR’s report, ‘Turn the Tide: Refugee Education in Crisis’, nearly two thirds of refugee children who go to primary school do not make it to secondary school. Read more: http://www.unhcr.org/ke/14309-refugee-students-at-m-pesa-foundation-academy-hone-their-skills-inentrepreneurship-leadership-and-sports.html

Refugee athletes from Kenya speak at global sports forums:
Refugee athlete Pur Biel from Kenya has had several speaking engagements and has been invited to several sporting events since taking part in the Rio Olympics 2016, as part of the first ever Refugee Olympic Team. However, the invitation to receive an award in New York from the International Crisis Group (ICG), on behalf of the refugees that participated in the Rio was a very special moment, Pur says. Read more: http://www.unhcr.org/ke/14215-refugee-athletes-from-kenya-speak-at-global-sports-forums.html

Awer Mabil: From living in a mud hut at a refugee camp to scoring for Australia:
The 23-year-old grew up in a refugee camp in Kenya, where hunger and cramped conditions were everyday problems for his family. After moving to Australia as part of a humanitarian programme, he was subjected to racism as he tried to make it as a footballer.
However, he has come through it all, and scored in his debut for his adopted nation in a 4-0 win in Kuwait in October. Read more: https://www.bbc.com/sport/football/46016449

Adut Akech, former Kakuma refugee, on opening doors for other models and building her own agency in South Sudan: Her roots – she was born in South Sudan and raised in the Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya – this is at the forefront of her mind when carving out her future. “Poverty is something that I think about it a lot. I’d like to start a foundation to help with homelessness,” she affirmed.

United Nations-coordinated Appeals

FUNDING REQUIRED $25.20B

FUNDING RECEIVED $11.97B

UNMET REQUIREMENTS $13.23B

COVERAGE 47.5%

PEOPLE IN NEED 135.3 M

PEOPLE TO RECEIVE AID 97.9 M

COUNTRIES AFFECTED 41

Global Humanitarian Funding

FUNDING RECEIVED $17.98B

UN-COORDINATED APPEALS $11.97B

OTHER FUNDING $6.01B

Global Appeal Status

• At the end of October 2018, 21 Humanitarian Response Plans (HRP) and the Syria Regional Response Plan (3RP) require US$25.20 billion to assist 97.9 million people in urgent need of humanitarian support. The plans are funded at $11.97 billion; this amounts to 47.5 per cent of financial requirements for 2018. Requirements are lower than in September 2018 due to revision of the Ethiopia Humanitarian and Disaster Resilience Plan (HDRP). For the remainder of 2018, humanitarian organizations require another $13.23 billion to meet the needs outlined in these plans.

• Global requirements are $1.10 billion higher than at this time last year. Overall coverage and the dollar amount were only marginally higher in late October than at the same time in 2017.

• On 8 October the Government of Ethiopia and humanitarian partners issued a Mid-Year Review of the HDRP. The revised plan reflects changes in the humanitarian context, and requires $1.49 billion for 2018, as opposed to the March 2018 requirement of $1.6 billion to reach some 7.88 million people in need of food or cash relief assistance and 8.49 million people with non-food assistance in the course of the year. Despite the general good performance of this year’s belg (spring) rains, the number of people targeted for relief food and cash support remains largely unchanged due to the significant spike in internal displacement since April 2018.

Security Council Briefings and High Level Missions

• At a briefing to the Security Council on 23 October, Under-Secretary-General/Emergency Relief Coordinator (USG/ERC) Mark Lowcock called on all stakeholders to do everything possible to avert catastrophe in Yemen. In a follow up note on the humanitarian situation in Yemen of 30 October, the USG/ERC thanked the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, United States, Kuwait, the United Kingdom and all donors for the record amount raised for the humanitarian appeal in 2018 which had meant nearly 8 million people had received assistance across the country; more than 7 million people had received food and more than 420,000 children been treated for malnutrition; clean water, sanitation and basic hygiene support is now available to 7.4 million people and about 8 million men, women, girls and boys had benefited from health services.

• At a Security Council briefing on the humanitarian situation in Syria on 29 October, the USG/ERC urged the Security Council and key Member States to ensure that the ceasefire holds in Syria's northwestern province of Idlib to prevent a military onslaught and overwhelming humanitarian suffering. He thanked donors for the $1.7 billion contributed so far towards the HRP for Syria, but pointed out that this HRP is currently funded at less than 50 per cent.

• In her statement to the Security Council on 30 October, Assistant Under-Secretary-General/Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator (ASG/DERC)
  Ursulla Mueller spoke of the steady decline in humanitarian funding for the Ukraine over the years and mentioned that the HRP for 2018 is funded at only 32 per cent. This is simply not enough to cover food, health care, water, sanitation and other life-saving assistance. ASG/DERC Mueller appealed to donors to increase their support for consolidating gains in anticipation of the fast-approaching winter.

• During a joint mission to Chad and Nigeria (5-7 October) with UNDP Administrator Achim Steiner, as part of a series of country visits the two will make to advance humanitarian-development collaboration, the USG/ERC called on donors to fulfil pledges and announcements of over $2 million made in Berlin last month at the High Level Conference on the Lake Chad Region (3-4 September). He noted the importance of maintaining humanitarian response in the region as needs were still very high.

• Following her visit to the Republic of the Philippines from 9 to 11 October, ASG/DERC Mueller announced that OCHA would continue advocating for sustained funding to address humanitarian needs of people displaced by the Marawi conflict while ensuring that support for the transition to longerterm and sustainable recovery is forthcoming.

Upcoming Event

• The Global Humanitarian Overview 2019 and World Humanitarian Data and Trends will be launched in the course of joint event to take place in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, from 10:00 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. on 4 December 2018.

Pooled Funds

• Between January and the end of October 2018, country-based pooled funds (CBPFs) have received a total of $708 million in contributions from 32 donors (including contributions through the UN Foundation). During the same period, a total of $616 million from the 18 operational funds was allocated towards 1,071 projects with 575 implementing partners. Nearly 40 per cent ($246 million) of the funds were allocated to international NGOs and some 26 per cent (approximately $160 million) to national NGOs. UN agencies received 32 per cent ($202 million) of the allocated funds and Red Cross/Red Crescent organizations received over 1 per cent (some $8 million) of all allocated funds. The largest allocations per sector went to health; food security; water, sanitation and hygiene; nutrition; emergency shelter and NFIs.

• Between 1 January and 31 October 2018, the Emergency Relief Coordinator approved $477 million in grants from the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) to support life-saving activities in 45 countries. This includes $297.7 million from the Rapid Response Window and $179.7 million from the Underfunded Emergencies (UFE) Window. A total of $31.6 million in Rapid Response grants was approved in October in response to cholera outbreaks in Zimbabwe, Niger and Nigeria; flooding in Laos; and the population influx from Venezuela to Brazil, Ecuador and Peru; as well as to support Government relief efforts following the earthquake and tsunami in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia. The UFE 2018 second round was completed this month, with $30.6 million approved in September and the remaining $49.4 million of the round’s $80 million released in October to assist people caught up in nine chronic emergencies in Angola, Bangladesh, Burundi, Central African Republic, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Libya,
  Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Sudan.

Country Updates

• Funding for humanitarian activities in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) is at an all-time low. Nearly all agencies requesting financial support through the HRP have received less funding in 2018 than in previous years. This leaves humanitarian partners ill-placed to meet emerging needs or respond to the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Gaza, where the rise in casualties during the recent demonstrations has stretched Gaza’s overburdened health system.
  Humanitarian agencies appealed in August for $43.8 million to respond to the Gaza crisis, particularly trauma management and emergency health care, in 2018. On 22 September, the Humanitarian Coordinator for the oPt launched an $8.3 million allocation from the oPt Humanitarian Fund to implement critical HRP projects, mainly in Gaza. Stocks of medical supplies are in extremely short supply and depleted to almost half of requirements. Since late October, the Gaza power plant has been providing up to eleven hours of electricity a day. However, around 250 health,
  WASH and essential solid waste facilities continue to rely on UN-procured emergency fuel for running back-up generators. This year’s intensive operations have depleted funds and stocks and the $1 million allocated by the oPt Humanitarian Fund for fuel supplies will only last until the end of November. Further and urgent financial support is therefore required.

• Conditions in Yemen continued to deteriorate in October, pushing the country to the brink of famine. On 23 October, the USG/ERC warned the Security Council that without urgent action, up to 14 million people – half the population – could face pre-famine conditions in the coming months.
  Assessments are currently under way, with initial results expected in mid-November. The economic crisis is raising the risk of famine. The Yemeni rial has depreciated by nearly 50 per cent over the last year. Commodity prices have soared, as Yemen imports 90 per cent of staple food and nearly all fuel and medicine.

Urgent steps are required to avert immediate catastrophe. First, a cessation of hostilities is needed; this is especially critical in populated areas.
Second, imports of food, fuel and other essentials must be able to enter Yemen without impediment. Roads must remain open so these goods can reach communities across the country. Third, the Yemeni economy must be supported, including by injecting foreign exchange, expediting credit for imports and paying salaries and pensions. Fourth, international funding must increase now to allow humanitarians to meet growing needs for assistance. Finally, all parties must engage with the UN Special Envoy to end the conflict. Yemen remains the largest humanitarian operation in the world, with more than 200 partners working through the Yemen HRP.

As of 30 September 2018, 810,227 Congolese refugees are being hosted in African countries. From 1 January to 30 September 2018 alone, some 139,395 Congolese fled to neighboring countries, with a particularly significant increase in refugee flows to Burundi, Uganda and Zambia.

UNHCR together with 43 humanitarian and development partners launched the revised Regional Refugee Response Plan (RRRP) on 17 July 2018 for $547 million to help respond to the needs of Congolese refugees in neighboring countries.

Regional Highlights and Operational Context

■ A total of 810,227 Congolese refugees and asylumseekers are being hosted in countries in Africa, which have generously maintained an open door policy in granting asylum to old and new asylum seekers.

■ The security conditions in the DRC, especially in the eastern and central provinces, remains volatile with sporadic outbreaks of violence leading to displacement of civilians within the country, and across borders to neighboring countries. This has placed the DRC refugee population among the ten largest in the world.

■ UNHCR received $148.5 million for the DRC situation, representing only 40 per cent of the total requirements for 2018.

■ The interagency RRRP for the DRC situation has received $76.9 million, representing only 14 per cent of the total requirements for 2018.

This update concerns the situation of Congolese refugees and asylum seekers in countries in the region.

810,227 Total number of refugees and asylum-seekers from the DRC.

4.5 M Internally displaced people Source: OCHA

941,000 Planning figure of DRC refugees by December 2018.

35 Total number of Congolese refugees assisted to return since January 2018

POPULATION FIGURES

• The figures in this report have been updated to reflect the results of a continuous biometric registration and verification exercise in countries of asylum.

• The total figures include additions (new arrivals and births) and subtractions (departures, deaths, no-shows during food distributions and deactivations).

EMERGENCY LEVELS

• A Level 2 emergency for UNHCR’s response to the situation in Ituri and North Kivu in the DRC was activated on 13 August 2018. The declaration shall remain in force for an initial period of six months, at which time it shall be reviewed.

• The Level 1 emergency that was activated on 10 September 2017 for Zambia and the Level 2 emergency on 16 February for Uganda, are ongoing.

FUNDING

• UNHCR received $148.5 million for the DRC situation, representing only 40 per cent of the total requirements for 2018, which amount to $368.7 million.

• The interagency Regional Refugee Response Plan (RRRP) for the DRC situation has received $76.9 million, representing only 14 per cent of the total requirements for 2018, which amount to $547 million.

Introduction

The conflict that broke out in South Sudan on 15 December 2013 displaced hundreds of thousands of civilians in South Sudan and continues to cause an outflow of refugees into neighboring countries including Sudan. Kharasana and El Meiram are among the newly established settlements receiving refugees and provided with basic protection and lifesaving interventions. These settlements are located in the south-west region of Sudan of West Kordofan state in Keilak and El Meiram localities respectively. The majority of refugees are women and children that fled from Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap and Abyei in South Sudan. During the time of this survey the refugee population was estimated as follows: in Kharasana 4,887 and El Meiram 10,422. The refugees’ settlements in Kharasana and El Meiram are unique in nature, whereby refugees are settled in the periphery of the local towns and living together with the host community. However, refugees identify themselves in the group settlement, subdivided into bocks. The house arrangement is similar to a usual standard village setting, as opposed to a typical camp house set-up.

This report summarizes the results of a Standardized Expanded Nutrition Survey (SENS) conducted in Kharasana and El Meiram refugee settlements during the period 22nd October and 4 th November 2017. The survey was aimed at assessing the general health, nutrition and mortality indices of refugees in order to establish baseline data and formulate action-oriented recommendations for appropriate nutrition, public health and related interventions.

SENS was conducted for South Sudanese refugees in settlements in South Kordofan State, Sudan to assess the general health and nutrition status of the refugee population, and formulate workable recommendations for appropriate nutritional and public health interventions. Results indicate critical (>15%) global acute malnutrition (GAM), with severe acute malnutrition (SAM) above emergency levels (>2%). The findings also point to the wider effects of chronic under-funding for the response, especially for WASH, health and livelihoods assistance. The SENS was implemented by UNHCR, with technical support from the Government of Sudan's Commission for Refugees (COR), the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), the State Ministry of Health, WHO, WFP, UNICEF, Care International Switzerland (CIS), Concern Worldwide and Al Manar Voluntary Organization.

SENS was conducted for South Sudanese refugee camps in White Nile State, Sudan to assess the general health and nutrition status of the refugee population, and formulate workable recommendations for appropriate nutritional and public health interventions. Results indicate critical (>15%) global acute malnutrition (GAM) across all camps, with severe acute malnutrition (SAM) above emergency levels (>2%). The findings also point to the wider effects of chronic under-funding for the response, especially for WASH, health and livelihoods assistance. The SENS was conducted jointly by UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, WHO, State Ministry of Health (MoH), the Commission for Refugees (COR), the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), the Sudanese Red Crescent Society (SRCS) and Global Health Foundation.