Abstract
Almost two years after South Sudan became Africa’s newest nation-state, its border with Sudan is neither delimited nor demarcated. While a series of agreements were signed in Addis Ababa on 27 September 2012, the status of the contested areas of the border and the explosive question of Abyei were left unresolved. At issue for both states are oil reserves in the border region, as well as some of the most fertile land in the two countries. The border region also contains crucial grazing areas for transhumant and pastoralist groups, which traditionally agreed flexible grazing arrangements between themselves long before discussions began about a national border dividing their territory. Seasonal pastoralist movements through the border region are one of the central tensions between the two states, and for border communities struggling to adapt to a newly nationalized boundary.
The 2011–12 dry season (October through May) was the first since South Sudan’s independence. During the dry season, Northern pastoralist groups drive herds of cattle south in search of pasture. While the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) enshrines pastoralist freedom of movement, which is also something both countries have repeatedly endorsed, the events of the previous grazing season show just how far these commitments are from being realized.
The Government of Sudan (GoS) blocked Northern pastoralists from travelling southwards because it feared border communities would renew links with groups in South Sudan, and thus threaten GoS control of the frontier by reducing these communities’ dependence on Sudan. The GoS is eager to prevent such links from developing as the number of Missiriya and Rizeigat—two border communities—now joining the SPLM-North (SPLM-N) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) is increasing. As a result of border closures and GoS threats, the political elites of many pastoralist groups, who are dependent on patronage from Khartoum, did not travel to meetings about grazing that were organized by the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) and Southern states in 2011 and 2012. The absence of elders and politically important figures undermined the efficacy of the agreements reached at these meetings. Other pastoralists did not migrate for fear of retaliation from the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) on their return.
The situation was no better in South Sudan. In general, migrants faced harassment from the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and hostility from communities bitterly opposed to their presence after 20 years of civil war. South Sudanese independence also fanned growing nationalist sentiment, and this has undercut the viability of grazing agreements with Northern groups.
The emergence of a national border into a complex environment containing many groups with different histories and narratives—especially during the second civil war—has deeply affected all of the communities in the region. This Working Paper explores these dynamics through five case studies: the Northern Bahr el Ghazal–East Darfur border; Abyei; the Unity–South Kordofan border; the Upper Nile–South Kordofan border; and the Upper Nile–White Nile border.
Key findings
• Grazing agreements are no longer simply between two local communities. Instead, the primary guarantor of migrant safety is the SPLA, and Northern migrants coming to the South must now first interact with the relevant state administrations. This reorientation of grazing agreements towards state level government and the army has tended to lessen the bonds of community coexistence; given that the SPLA is the main group from whom migrants need to be protected, it has also undermined the efficacy of grazing agreements.
• All along the border, there is confusion about which administrative levels should organize grazing routes. Maban county, in Upper Nile, organizes its own county-level courts to rule on disagreements between host communities and pastoralists; other counties want such courts to stay at the level of the host communities and the migrant groups. Taxation of migrant groups is similarly disaggregated between different actors, leading to confusion and anger between pastoralist groups and host communities.
• In some places along the border, relations between migrants and host communities have broken down to such an extent that only government intervention keeps grazing routes open. In other places, inter-community relations are relatively healthy, and it is government intervention that has militarized the border, and made trade and migration more difficult.
• Differences in cross-border relations correspond, with relatively high degrees of accuracy, to the different relations seen during the second civil war between groups that are now on either side of the border.
• Prior to South Sudan’s secession, cross-border relations were marked by a degree of reciprocity: Northern pastoralist groups and their herds came south in the dry season, while Southern migrant labourers went north. There is now asymmetry along the border, as Northern pastoralists still seek to enter the South, but, due to harassment in Sudan, far fewer Southerners travel north for work.
• The border is highly militarized by a plethora of armed actors. In Unity state, SAF have armed and supported the South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA), though it has since accepted an amnesty offered by the GRSS and is awaiting integration into the SPLA. In Upper Nile, SAF have armed Major General Johnson Olonyi’s forces, providing active military support in at least one attack in 2012. These forces have also accepted an amnesty as of June 2013, though other smaller groups remain active in the border area. The SPLA have bases throughout the border region, as do JEM and the SPLA-N. Although most grazing agreements made by Southern host communities and Northern pastoralists insist that no weapons should be carried across the border, pastoralists generally remain in possession of small arms when in South Sudan. They report extensive harassment by the SPLA. In a climate of general uncertainty, it is highly unlikely that they will be convinced of the virtues of disarmament in the near future.
Download and further information
‘Dividing lines’ is the 30th Working Paper published by the Small Arms Survey’s HSBA project. It can be downloaded directly here:
http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-W...